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Election Law Pleading
Joshua A. Douglas*
ABSTRACT
This Article provides the first comprehensive look at pleadings in election
law cases after the Supreme Court’s jurisprudential shift for pleading in Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal. In those cases, the Supreme Court declared that plaintiffs must meet a “factual plausibility” test in
their complaints, providing enough factual specificity to explain the basis for
their suit. Courts in election cases have tried to follow this formulation. But
applying Twombly and Iqbal to election law is incongruent with the main features of election litigation, leading to an awkward and sloppy analysis. There
is usually little need to assess whether the plaintiff presented detailed factual
allegations in a complaint when everyone usually agrees on how an election
practice operates and the real question is whether the election regulation violates some law. A court deciding a motion to dismiss in an election case
should therefore focus on the other aspect of Rule 12(b)(6): legal sufficiency.
To do so, this Article proposes a pleading standard that would supplement factual plausibility, which I term “legal plausibility.” In addition to requiring sufficient factual allegations—which are often not the crux of an
election dispute, at least at the complaint stage—pleading rules should force
election law plaintiffs to make a plausible showing that the challenged practice
is legally flawed. This requires the plaintiff to plead the requisite mixed question of law and fact that will ultimately determine whether the plaintiff can
prevail. Legal plausibility entails three parts: plaintiffs should identify the precise election practice being challenged, explain with particularity how the law
impacts that plaintiff, and apply the elements of the cause of action to the
manner in which the election regulation operates. This standard will be particularly helpful for litigants and courts when the case at hand exhibits the dual
features of timeliness concerns and a lack of viable post-election remedies—
which encompasses a lot of election litigation. Although I focus on election
cases, legal plausibility could apply to other areas that are similar to election
law. Legal plausibility shifts the way in which courts analyze motions to dismiss. It helps courts streamline election litigation by avoiding the doctrinal
incongruence that accompanies the application of factual plausibility to election law cases.
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School of Law for extremely valuable comments. Thanks also to Colin Bruckel, Virginia
Deaton, Jessica Logsdon, and Gordon Mowen for excellent research assistance.
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INTRODUCTION
Pleading law is a mess. In two recent cases, the Supreme Court
dropped a jurisprudential bombshell on virtually all civil litigation, altering what seemed to be settled practice regarding the level of factual
detail needed in a complaint and replacing that standard with a
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heightened pleading requirement.1 Both Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly2 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal3 shifted pleading rules from a fairly
liberal “notice pleading” standard to a more rigorous “factual plausibility” regime.4 Plaintiffs are now required to provide more “facts” in
their complaint to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim.5 Because these cases apply to all civil litigation, the effects in
many substantive areas are still being sorted out in both the scholarship and the lower courts. To date, however, no one has explored the
impact of these cases on election law, an area that is foundational to
our democracy.
This Article analyzes the role of the Twombly/Iqbal pleading
standard in the fast-growing field of election law, filling a gap in both
the civil procedure and election law literature. Federal courts are increasingly asked to wade into a myriad of election law disputes, including those involving redistricting, ballot access, campaign finance,
and election administration.6 What effect, if any, has the factual plausibility standard from Twombly and Iqbal had on election law cases?
More importantly, does this new standard make sense for this substantive area?
Ultimately, the new factual plausibility scheme established in
Twombly and Iqbal has led courts hearing election cases to focus too
much on factual allegations, even when the facts are undisputed and
the real question is whether the complaint is legally sufficient.7 Thinking they need to consider just the Twombly and Iqbal inquiry of factual sufficiency, courts are either not asking the legal sufficiency
question or are considering it obliquely.
Twombly and Iqbal, however, answer only part of the question in
election cases, and their rule focuses on an issue that is often not in
dispute. Frequently, the plaintiff in an election-related challenge
should have no problem satisfying Twombly and Iqbal’s factual plausibility test. The real question is whether, under the law the plaintiff
invokes, the plaintiff has a legally viable cause of action. That is,
courts are forgetting the other aspect of a complaint: whether the
1

See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544

(2007).
2

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).

3

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).

4

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–80; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555–63.

5

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556–67.

6

See infra Part II.

7

See infra Part IV.
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plaintiff’s claim is legally sufficient.8 Analyzing the main goals behind
pleading law with the salient features of election litigation demonstrates the incongruence of relying solely on the Supreme Court’s new
pleading rules for these cases. Twombly and Iqbal’s factual plausibility standard for deciding a motion to dismiss obscures the main inquiry in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion in an election case: whether, given all
of the facts, the plaintiff is still not entitled to any legal recourse under
the law. Election disputes, with their primary focus on the law and
not the facts, call for a more refined approach.
This Article proposes a more complete standard for analyzing the
sufficiency of an election law pleading. This additional pleading
threshold, which I term “legal plausibility,” requires plaintiffs to provide more “law” in their complaints, demonstrating to a plausible
level why the challenged election practice is invalid based on the elements of the cause of action.9 Legal plausibility best comports with
both the goals of pleading rules and the main features of election law
cases. The standard will be particularly helpful for litigants and courts
when the case at hand exhibits the dual features of timeliness concerns
and a lack of viable post-election remedies—which encompasses a lot
of election litigation.10 Of course, legal plausibility could apply in
other substantive settings that share the characteristics of election
cases. It also could be useful in providing guidance for courts considering preliminary injunction motions, particularly in last-minute election disputes. This Article focuses on developing and applying legal
plausibility for motions to dismiss in election cases as a model for reforming pleading rules for litigation of this kind.
The Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I recounts the history of
pleading rules, starting with historical pleading practices and leading
up to the Supreme Court’s recent reformulation of pleading law in
Twombly and Iqbal. Part I also examines recent studies on the impact
of Twombly and Iqbal in various substantive areas.
Part II discusses courts’ use of Twombly and Iqbal in election law
cases. It describes how election cases typically fall into one of four
categories: redistricting disputes, ballot access challenges, campaign finance lawsuits, and disputes involving election administration. Part II
then considers the effects of Twombly and Iqbal for each area of election litigation, showing why an analysis of election complaints under
8

See infra notes 38–41 and accompanying text.

9

See infra Part IV.A.

10

See infra Part IV.B.1.
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Twombly and Iqbal is often insufficient to determine whether the
plaintiffs actually have a viable claim.
Part III discusses four unique characteristics of election cases that
should inform the best pleading rules for this area: the government or
a governmental actor is almost always the defendant; plaintiffs often
already have the facts they need to assert that an election practice is
unlawful, and therefore the cases typically turn on the legal implications of an election rule; there is very often pretrial judicial resolution
of the dispute without a full-blown hearing; and the cases rarely, if
ever, settle. These traits suggest that the factual plausibility standard
from Twombly and Iqbal is incongruent with the realities of election
litigation. Part III also highlights several specific goals to consider in
any pleading regime for election law disputes and explains why current proposals for reforming pleading law do not adequately address
these issues.
Part IV introduces legal plausibility. In addition to requiring sufficient factual allegations—which are often not the crux of an election
dispute, at least at the complaint stage—pleading rules should force
election law plaintiffs to make a plausible showing that the challenged
practice is legally flawed. Such a rule would require plaintiffs to plead
the mixed question of law and fact that will determine the merits of
their case. To do so, plaintiffs should identify the precise election
practice being challenged, explain with particularity how the law impacts that plaintiff, and apply the elements of the cause of action to
the manner in which the election regulation operates. Legal plausibility would shift the way in which courts analyze motions to dismiss. It
would help courts streamline election litigation by weeding out those
lawsuits that have no legal merit, allowing courts to spend more time
and energy on the salient and difficult cases that require quick resolution before an election. Finally, Part IV demonstrates how legal plausibility would operate in a variety of election law disputes.
The easiest course for adopting legal plausibility is for courts to
recognize this standard as a complement to Twombly and Iqbal.
Whereas Twombly and Iqbal’s factual plausibility regime might make
sense for those cases that turn on the underlying factual events, courts
could invoke legal plausibility for cases, like many election law disputes, that rest on the legal sufficiency of the allegations. Legal plausibility therefore provides a framework for courts to answer the legal
sufficiency question.
Barring judicial action, legal plausibility is also a good candidate
for statutory reform. Congress has already recognized the uniqueness
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and importance of election litigation by promulgating various procedural rules for election cases.11 Congress could similarly enact legal
plausibility as part of a new election law pleading statute. In doing so,
Congress can analogize to its previous action in reforming the scope of
prisoner litigation in the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”),12
which also focuses on whether a plaintiff’s complaint asserts a viable
cause of action.13 Enacting legal plausibility as a counterpart and supplement to the pleading rules from Twombly and Iqbal will help
courts achieve faster and better decisionmaking in all election cases by
giving judges a tool to analyze cases from the outset. It also will help
to clarify what plaintiffs should include in a complaint and the proper
method of judicial analysis for a motion to dismiss an election case.
I. FROM CODE PLEADING

TO

TWOMBLY

AND

IQBAL

This Part traces the evolution of pleading law from the historical
days of code pleading to the Supreme Court’s most recent formulation
in Twombly and Iqbal. It also highlights the main goals our system
seeks to achieve in requiring certain kinds of pleadings. Finally, it
summarizes recent studies of the effects of Twombly and Iqbal on civil
litigation. It therefore sets the stage for considering the proper rules
for pleading in election law cases.
A. A Brief History of Pleading Law
Scholars have documented extensively the history of pleading
from common law and code pleading to Twombly and Iqbal.14 Here, I
trace that history briefly to provide a foundation for the discussion of
pleading as it relates to election law cases.
Pleading rules initially were a function of common law.15 A plaintiff first had to fit his or her complaint through a certain “form of
11 See generally Joshua A. Douglas, The Procedure of Election Law in Federal Courts, 2011
UTAH L. REV. 433 [hereinafter Douglas, Procedure of Election Law].
12 Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321,
1321–66 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
13 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c) (2006).
14 See, e.g., A. Benjamin Spencer, Pleading Civil Rights Claims in the Post-Conley Era, 52
HOW. L.J. 99, 104–24 (2008) [hereinafter Spencer, Pleading Civil Rights Claims]; Stephen N.
Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 916 (1987); Devon J. Stewart, Note, Take Me Home to
Conley v. Gibson, Country Roads: An Analysis of the Effect of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
and Ashcroft v. Iqbal on West Virginia’s Pleading Doctrine, 113 W. VA. L. REV. 167, 171–79
(2010).
15 See Subrin, supra note 14, at 916.
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action,” which, if done incorrectly, resulted in an incurable defect.16 If
the plaintiff’s form of action was proper, the defendant would respond
with a specified type of answer, which could be either a demurrer
(challenging the legal entitlement to relief), a traverse (challenging
the plaintiff’s facts), or a confession and avoidance (asserting additional facts excusing the defendant’s conduct).17 These pleadings
would narrow the case to a single issue of law or fact for a judge to
decide.18 This “scientific” formulaic system allowed the parties to go
back and forth as they disposed of various issues until the court was
left with a final question that would resolve the case.19 The process
“proved to be excruciatingly slow, expensive, and unworkable. The
system was better calculated to vindicate highly technical rules of
pleading than it was to dispense justice.”20
Next came code pleading.21 Often referred to as the “Field
Code,” named after David Dudley Field, who authored the New York
Code of 1848,22 code pleading emphasized the presentation of facts.23
Code pleading required the plaintiff to present only the facts, devoid
of evidentiary assertions or conclusions.24 The problem, of course, is
that the line between facts, evidence, and conclusions is murky at best,
and thus plaintiffs were not clear as to what they needed to plead.25
An Advisory Committee to the Supreme Court promulgated the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938 to respond to some of the
problems of common law pleading and code pleading.26 Rule 8(a)(2),
as finalized, requires plaintiffs to provide merely “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”27
To demonstrate the seeming simplicity of the Rule, Form 11 (formerly
Form 9) provides an example: “On [Date], at [Place], the defendant
See id. at 917.
See id. at 916.
18 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1202 (3d ed. 2004).
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Stewart, supra note 14, at 172.
22 See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 573–74 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
23 Stewart, supra note 14, at 172. After New York adopted the Field Code, most other
states followed suit. See Victor E. Schwartz & Christopher E. Appel, Rational Pleading in the
Modern World of Civil Litigation: The Lessons and Public Policy Benefits of Twombly and Iqbal,
33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1107, 1115–16 (2010).
24 5 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 18, § 1202.
25 See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 574 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
26 See Spencer, Pleading Civil Rights Claims, supra note 14, at 104; see also Stewart, supra
note 14, at 173–74.
27 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
16
17
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negligently drove a motor vehicle against the plaintiff.”28 Thus, a
complaint under the Federal Rules’ “notice pleading” standard simply
must assert the background facts (date and place) and “facts which
disclose the manner of the occurrence.”29 Only a cause of action for
fraud or mistake must state “the circumstances constituting” the alleged wrong “with particularity.”30
The Supreme Court, in Conley v. Gibson,31 gave credence to the
idea that the Federal Rules were intended to liberalize pleading standards.32 The Court held that a plaintiff need not set out the specific
factual details of his or her claim.33 Instead, Rule 8(a)(2) simply requires “a short and plain statement of the claim” that will give the
defendant fair notice of what the claim is about and the grounds upon
which it rests.34 Further, in the opinion’s most important language,
the Court stated that a lower court should not grant a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim “unless it appears beyond doubt that
the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which
would entitle him to relief.”35
So the law stood, for roughly fifty years:
For several decades, Conley stood as a guarantor that . . .
claimants would at least be able to get into court and on to
discovery, not being forced to provide factual details underlying their claims at the pleading stage that they might not
have access to prior to discovery.36
Indeed, some lower courts tried to implement heightened pleading standards for certain cases, such as civil rights claims, but the Supreme Court rebuked these efforts and maintained the liberal “notice
pleading” standard from Conley.37
Moreover, the Conley standard recognizes that a complaint may
be insufficient for two separate reasons: first, because the facts themselves do not present a claim, even under the liberal notice pleading
standard; or second, because the substantive law does not grant any
FED. R. CIV. P. Form 11.
Stewart, supra note 14, at 176.
30 FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).
31 Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
32 Id. at 47–48.
33 Id.
34 Id. at 47.
35 Id. at 45–46.
36 Spencer, Pleading Civil Rights Claims, supra note 14, at 102.
37 See id. (citing Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 513 (2002), and Leatherman
v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993)).
28
29
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right to relief regardless of the factual detail in the complaint.38 For
example, in Haddle v. Garrison39 the Supreme Court considered
whether the Civil Rights Act recognized a cause of action against an
employer who fires an at-will employee for being a whistleblower.40
The question was not whether the plaintiff’s factual content was sufficient, but instead whether the law itself would recognize the plaintiff’s
claim.41 The Court did not set out a standard by which to test a complaint’s legal sufficiency, however, as it simply declared that the plaintiff had asserted a legally valid cause of action.
Then came Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly in 2007, which placed
the focus on the factual plausibility of a complaint.42 In that case, the
Court considered the sufficiency of a complaint alleging an antitrust
conspiracy involving regional telephone carriers.43 The Court held
that the complaint was insufficient because it did not allege facts that
rendered the asserted liability “plausible.”44 The Court stated that “a
plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to
relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”45 Thus,
“[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above
the speculative level.”46
In its opinion, the Court suggested that there are three “zones of
pleading.”47 The first zone includes pleadings that are “conclusory.”48
The second zone contains pleadings that are “factually neutral.”49 The
final zone encompasses pleadings that are “factually suggestive.”50
The Court noted that a plaintiff must proceed through each zone “to
38 See Bradley Scott Shannon, I Have Federal Pleading All Figured Out, 61 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 453, 471 (2011) (noting that the “no set of facts” language from Conley relates to legal
insufficiency, as opposed to factual insufficiency).
39

Haddle v. Garrison, 525 U.S. 121 (1998).

40

Id. at 122.

Id. at 123–25; see also Scott Dodson, A New Look: Dismissal Rates of Federal Civil
Claims, 96 JUDICATURE 127, 128 (2012) (explaining that under Conley’s standard “a federal
court could dismiss a civil claim under Rule 12(b)(6) only if legally insufficient”).
41

42

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).

Id. at 550–51. For a detailed discussion of Twombly, see A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV. 431 (2008).
43

44
45
46
47
48
49
50

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557.
Id. at 555.
Id.
See Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, supra note 43, at 448.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 n.5; Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, supra note 43, at 448.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 n.5; Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, supra note 43, at 448.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 n.5; Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, supra note 43, at 448.
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enter the realm of plausible liability.”51 That is, only “factually suggestive” complaints meet the Court’s new standard for sufficiency. A
plaintiff must now plead that liability is more than just possible but
instead is plausible, using the alleged facts and not merely the elements of the cause of action.52
In further crafting a new standard for pleading, the Court in
Twombly “retire[d]” Conley’s “no set of facts” language,53 stating:
“The phrase is best forgotten as an incomplete, negative gloss on an
accepted pleading standard: once a claim has been stated adequately,
it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the
allegations in the complaint.”54 Thus, the Court in essence overruled
Conley’s liberal pleading standard for a more rigid “plausibility”
requirement.
Although some commentators thought Twombly might be a oneoff case confined to the antitrust context,55 the Court just two years
later in Ashcroft v. Iqbal made clear that the factual plausibility standard applies to all complaints.56 The Court identified a two-step process to review the sufficiency of a complaint. First, a court should
“identify[ ] pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions,
are not entitled to the assumption of truth.”57 Second, once the court
has disregarded conclusory statements, the court should assume the
veracity of well-pleaded factual allegations and “determine whether
they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.”58 Further, the
Court stated that federal judges could use their “experience and common sense” to determine if a complaint alleged sufficiently plausible
facts.59
The shift from Conley’s “no set of facts” standard to Twombly
and Iqbal’s “factual plausibility” test demonstrates the Supreme
Court’s concern about the rising cost of litigation, and particularly, of
discovery.60 As one commentator explains:
If pleading standards are too lenient, plaintiffs without meritorious claims could force innocent defendants to endure the
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 n.5.
See Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, supra note 43, at 448.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 562–63.
Id. at 563.
See, e.g., Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, supra note 43, at 457–59.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009).
Id. at 679.
Id.
Id.
Adam N. Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1293, 1311 (2010).
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costs of discovery and, perhaps, extract a nuisance settlement
from a defendant who would rather pay the plaintiff to make
the case go away. The need to avoid this situation is a commonly asserted policy justification for stricter pleading
standards.61
Through these two cases, the Court has made it harder for many
plaintiffs to bring claims because they must support their complaints—before any discovery has taken place—with more specific
“plausible” factual allegations.62 The cases “reflect[ ] a certain judicial
mood toward litigation, an attitude of hostility and skepticism toward
supplicants with alleged grievances against the government or against
the powerful who make up the dominant class.”63
As discussed below, various scholars have highlighted the
problems inherent in requiring detailed factual pleading when the
plaintiff does not have access to the necessary facts without discovery.64 What has gone unexplored is the reality that the Court’s focus
on heightening the standard for the factual sufficiency of a complaint
obscures the other important inquiry in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion:
whether the defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.65
Even when the facts are established and uncontroverted, the plaintiff
still must show that the substantive law supports the claim.66 The
plaintiff might be able to plead precisely what happened, and yet the
law would not recognize legal liability because, even under those facts,
the defendant has not violated any law. That is, a complaint can be
legally insufficient.67 For example, the defendant might have breathed
the air surrounding the plaintiff, and the plaintiff could allege this fact
with particularity, but the law still does not provide the plaintiff with a
Id. at 1311 (footnotes omitted).
See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
63 A. Benjamin Spencer, Iqbal and the Slide Toward Restrictive Procedure, 14 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 185, 200 (2010); see also Robert G. Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, and the
Regulation of Court Access, 94 IOWA L. REV. 873, 876 (2009) (construing Twombly as a “court
access decision, one that addresses a general problem of institutional design: how best to prevent
undesirable lawsuits from entering the court system”).
64 See infra Part I.C.
65 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
66 See Richard A. Epstein, Bell Atlantic v. Twombly: How Motions to Dismiss Become
(Disguised) Summary Judgments, 25 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 61, 61 (2007) (“The present Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure allow a plaintiff’s case to be attacked either for its legal or factual
sufficiency.”); Shannon, supra note 38, at 468 (explaining that “in addition to factual sufficiency,
a claim must be legally sufficient”); see also, e.g., Haddle v. Garrison, 525 U.S. 121, 126–27 (1998)
(reversing the grant of a motion to dismiss because, as a legal matter, the Civil Rights Act supported a claim for damages from the firing of an at-will employee).
67 See Shannon, supra note 38, at 467–68.
61
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right to relief because there is no cause of action for breathing someone’s air.68 Twombly and Iqbal did not touch upon this part of the
Rule 12(b)(6) analysis because the plaintiffs in those cases had valid
legal claims, assuming they could present the correct level of facts.
But the current discussion surrounding pleading law suggests that this
legal inquiry is absent in construing a motion to dismiss.
Indeed, as detailed below, most courts have tried to apply the
Twombly and Iqbal standard to motions to dismiss in election cases,
even if what is really in dispute is whether the plaintiff has a legally
cognizable claim, not whether the plaintiff can present enough facts.69
The Supreme Court invited this confusion by highlighting the importance of factual plausibility and declaring that a recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.70 Lower courts have followed
the Supreme Court’s lead, focusing solely on the factual sufficiency of
a complaint.71 But not all areas of the law involve cases in which the
pleaded facts matter the most. Some areas, such as election law, often
depend on whether the plaintiff can allege properly that the substantive law recognizes a cause of action based on the uncontroverted
facts. Twombly and Iqbal do not tell courts how to construe those
kinds of cases. This is a significant gap given that there is a cognitive
dissonance when courts try to apply Twombly and Iqbal’s factual
plausibility standard to cases that do not require robust factual development. An additional, nuanced standard for testing the legal sufficiency of a complaint is necessary for cases, such as many election law
suits, that rest on whether the plaintiff has alleged a legally cognizable
cause of action under the substantive law.72
B. General Goals for Pleading Rules
Historically, there were four main goals behind the highly technical common law and code pleading requirements of early pleading
law: “(1) giving notice of the nature of a claim or defense; (2) stating
the facts each party believes to exist; (3) narrowing the issues that
must be litigated; and (4) providing a means for speedy disposition of
sham claims and insubstantial defenses.”73
I am indebted to my colleague, Scott Bauries, for this example.
See infra Part II.
70 See, e.g., Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 n.5 (2007).
71 See infra Part II.
72 See infra Part IV.
73 5 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 18, § 1202; see also FEC v. Fla. for Kennedy Comm.,
492 F. Supp. 587, 598 (S.D. Fla. 1980).
68
69
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The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure came along in 1938 with the
specific goal of increasing court access for plaintiffs.74 The notice
pleading standard from Rule 8 “was designed to minimize greatly the
number of cases dismissed on the pleadings.”75 In addition, notice
pleading sought to ensure accurate resolution of cases on the merits
instead of based on a technical defect in the complaint.76 Rule 8, as
originally adopted, thus sought to foster fewer dismissals and accurate
merits-based decisionmaking.77 In recognizing that the purpose of
pleadings has varied over time, Charles Clark, the widely acknowledged founder of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summarized:
“[I]n common law pleading especial emphasis was placed upon the
issue-formulating function of pleading; under the earlier code pleading
like emphasis was placed upon stating the material, ultimate facts in the
pleadings; while at the present time the emphasis seems to have
shifted to the notice function of pleading.”78
Professor Spencer adds another goal to notice pleading rules:
“the promotion of private efficiency and inexpensiveness.”79 As Professor Spencer explains, “[n]otice pleading permits litigants to assert
claims without incurring the delay and expense that would accompany
an obligation to plead detailed facts.”80 Other procedural tenets, such
as discovery rules and summary judgment motions, served the purpose of the other historical goals, such as gathering the facts and ensuring the dismissal of frivolous cases before trial.81
Twombly and Iqbal seemingly altered the main goals behind
pleading rules:
Iqbal places considerable doubt on the proposition that Rule
8 continues to serve the primary function of notice and broad
access to the courts, and strongly suggests that the Court has
identified a new direction for the pleading paradigm: that
74 See A. Benjamin Spencer, The Restrictive Ethos in Civil Procedure, 78 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 353, 354 (2010) [hereinafter Spencer, Restrictive Ethos] (“That the Federal Rules were
originally designed to promote access cannot be denied. The very notion of uniformity itself was
an innovation designed to make the civil justice system more accessible to litigants.”).
75 Id.
76 Id. at 355–56.
77 Id. at 355.
78 Charles E. Clark, History, Systems and Functions of Pleading, 11 VA. L. REV. 517,
518–19 (1925).
79 Spencer, Restrictive Ethos, supra note 74, at 357.
80 Id. (citing 5 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 18, § 1202 (“The relevant facts may be
determined by discovery . . . . The only function left to be performed by the pleadings alone is
that of notice.” (footnote omitted))).
81 Id. at 359–60, 362–63.
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policy concerns regarding efficient case management, weeding out meritless claims, avoiding prohibitive costs of discovery abuse, and alleviating overcrowded dockets, are now the
most important considerations when evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint under Rule 8.82
Thus, Twombly and Iqbal, with their requirement that complaints
demonstrate a factually “plausible” entitlement to relief, call into
question whether notice to the defendant is the primary function of
pleading law. Surely, Bell Atlantic and the other defendants in
Twombly knew that they were being sued for antitrust violations and
understood the basis of the plaintiff’s suit. But because the plaintiff
did not rule out a lawful explanation for the defendants’ conduct, the
Court declared that the plaintiff’s complaint did not assert a factually
plausible claim for relief.83 This demonstrates how notice is no longer
enough to sustain a complaint. Instead, today’s pleading regime encompasses multifaceted goals of “notice-giving, process-facilitating,
and merits-screening.”84
Additionally, Twombly and Iqbal undermine the previous goal of
ensuring that cases receive adjudication on the merits instead of pretrial dismissal based on the form of the complaint.85 As studies of preand post-Twombly and Iqbal dismissals highlight, courts now toss out
more cases at the outset based on insufficient (i.e., factually implausible) pleadings.86 This undoubtedly leads to fewer merits-based resolutions of cases.
Twombly and Iqbal do help to effectuate one of the goals that
Professor Spencer highlighted for a pleading regime: efficiency of the
court system.87 Although Professor Spencer identified this efficiency
in terms of easing the plaintiff’s burden in bringing a case,88 the Court
has now swung the pendulum the other way. The rules promote efficiency on the defendant’s side by making it easier and faster for defendants to rid themselves of lawsuits against them. That is, Twombly
82 J. Scott Pritchard, Comment, The Hidden Costs of Pleading Plausibility: Examining The
Impact of Twombly and Iqbal on Employment Discrimination Complaints and the EEOC’s Litigation and Mediation Efforts, 83 TEMP. L. REV. 757, 779–80 (2011) (footnotes omitted).
83 Bell Atl. Corp v. Twombly, 550 U.S 544, 556–57 (2007).
84 Steinman, supra note 60, at 1347.
85 See Stephen B. Burbank, Pleading and the Dilemmas of “General Rules,” 2009 WIS. L.
REV. 535, 561 (describing Twombly as “the most recent signal of a retreat from the goal of
adjudication on the merits”).
86 See infra Part II.A.
87 See Spencer, Restrictive Ethos, supra note 74, at 357.
88 See id.
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and Iqbal still promote efficient resolution of cases, but they do so by
cutting off plaintiffs in the first instance.
The procedural pleading goals our system promotes, of course,
have a significant substantive impact. Having strict or narrow pleading requirements determines whether plaintiffs can seek redress for
alleged injuries and impacts the case load of the courts:
For all intents and purposes, that initial pleading is the key to
the courthouse door. If pleading standards are too strict, the
door becomes impenetrable. But if pleading standards are
too lenient, concerns arise that opportunistic plaintiffs without meritorious claims will force innocent parties to endure
the burdens of litigation and, perhaps, extract a nuisance settlement from a cost-conscious defendant who would rather
pay to make the case go away.89
Through Twombly and Iqbal, the Supreme Court demonstrated its desire to close the courthouse door because of concerns regarding the
cost to defendants of frivolous lawsuits and case manageability.90
In sum, although the goals behind pleading rules under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure—at least from the time of their adoption
through Conley and its progeny—centered around notice and meritsbased decisions, the goals today include cutting off seemingly frivolous claims, cabining discovery costs, and decreasing the federal
courts’ dockets. Given that Iqbal reaffirmed Twombly’s application
to all cases, the current Court is unlikely to alter these foundational
principles for pleading law any time soon. Under this regime, and to
ensure a realistic chance of adoption, a reformed system for pleading
cases that focuses on the legal operation of a particular rule must keep
these current goals in mind.
C. The Effects of the Supreme Court’s Recent Pleading Decisions
on Civil Litigation
What impact have the two recent pleading cases had on civil litigation in general? The story that emerges from recent studies is one
of restricted access to the courts for certain kinds of litigants. Indeed,
Twombly and Iqbal have seemed to hurt civil rights plaintiffs in particular.91 This Section surveys previous studies of Twombly and Iqbal’s
effects to situate the discussion of election law cases into the existing
Steinman, supra note 60, at 1294–95.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684–85 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
559, 562 (2007).
91 See infra note 114 and accompanying text.
89
90
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scholarly framework. The next Part examines the effect of these cases
for plaintiffs alleging election-related claims.
The Federal Judicial Center’s (“FJC”) compilation of motion to
dismiss rates in the aftermath of Twombly and Iqbal is perhaps the
most important study to date.92 The FJC looked at the number of
motions to dismiss filed and granted in twenty-three district courts
both before Twombly and after Iqbal.93 The study examined the number of motions filed and granted through the federal courts’ electronic
filing system, Case Management/Electronic Case Filing (“CM/ECF”),
instead of using either Lexis Nexis’s or Westlaw’s electronic databases,
in an effort to be more comprehensive and to ward off any bias toward published opinions.94 The FJC found that “[t]here was a general
increase from 2006 to 2010 in the rate of filing of motions to dismiss
for failure to state a claim,” to a statistically significant level.95 The
study demonstrated that prior to Twombly, a defendant filed a motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim in 4% of cases, but after Iqbal the
rate increased to 6.2%.96 Construed slightly differently, “[i]n the postIqbal period it was twice as likely that a plaintiff would face a motion
to dismiss.”97 The FJC determined, however, that “there was no increase in the rate of grants of motions to dismiss without leave to
amend” after Iqbal.98 Similarly, there was no increase in the rate of
dismissal grants in civil rights cases, which included voting rights
claims—although voting cases constituted only 0.6% of the cases examined.99 The only statistically significant change in the success of a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim was in cases challenging
financial instruments.100
92 JOE S. CECIL ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MOTIONS TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE
CLAIM AFTER IQBAL: REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON
CIVIL RULES (2011), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/motioniqbal.pdf/$file/
motioniqbal.pdf.
A

93

See id. at 5.

Id. at 2, 5; cf. Elizabeth Y. McCuskey, Clarity and Clarification: Grable Federal Questions in the Eyes of Their Beholders, 91 NEB. L. REV. 387, 441–44 (2012) (discussing the pitfalls
of conducting comparative case research using only Lexis and Westlaw but recounting the difficulties of using CM/ECF).
94

95

CECIL

96

ET AL.,

Id. at 8.

supra note 92, at vii, 8 & n.15.

Lonny Hoffman, Twombly and Iqbal’s Measure: An Assessment of the Federal Judicial
Center’s Study of Motions to Dismiss, 6 FED. CTS. L. REV. 1, 11 (2011), http://www.fclr.org/fclr/
articles/html/2010/Hoffman.pdf.
97

98

CECIL

99

Id. at vii, 9 n.17.

100

ET AL.,

Id. at 21.

supra note 92, at vii.
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The FJC study has not gone without critique. Professor Lonny
Hoffman demonstrated that the data in the FJC study may have been
incomplete, particularly with respect to the filing rate of motions to
dismiss.101 He further suggested that, read carefully, “the study confuses readers into thinking that it demonstrated the Court’s decisions
had no impact on dismissal practice,” and he pointed out that the
“failure to prove the decisions had an effect is not the same as proof
that the decisions had no effect.”102 Finally, Professor Hoffman posited that the researchers could not detect certain effects from the
cases, such as the number of potential plaintiffs who chose not to file a
case because of fears of a dismissal under Twombly and Iqbal.103 At
minimum, the FJC study shows that Twombly and Iqbal have had an
impact, even if the precise measure and contours of that impact are
unclear.
Other researchers also have found that Twombly and Iqbal have
had a substantive effect. One study showed that after Twombly there
was a 1.81 times greater likelihood of a successful motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim, and after Iqbal a grant of a motion to
dismiss was four times as likely as under Conley.104 Moreover, the
study noted that
in the largest category of cases in which 12(b)(6) motions
were filed—constitutional civil rights cases—motions to dismiss were granted at a higher rate (53%) than in all cases
combined (49%), and the rate 12(b)(6) motions were
granted in those cases increased from Conley (50%) to
Twombly (55%) to Iqbal (60%).105
It is unclear, however, whether any of the “constitutional civil rights
cases” included election- or voting-related claims.106 In a 2012 followup to that same study, the newer research showed that the “impact of
Iqbal has intensified,” as “the odds of the case being entirely dismissed upon the grant of a 12(b)(6) motion without leave to amend
101

Hoffman, supra note 97, at 8, 34–35.

102

Id. at 7.

Id. at 29–30. The FJC has responded to these and other critiques. See Joe S. Cecil, Of
Waves and Water: A Response to Comments on the FJC Study Motions to Dismiss for Failure to
State a Claim After Iqbal (Mar. 19, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers
.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2026103.
103

104 Patricia W. Hatamyar, The Tao of Pleading: Do Twombly and Iqbal Matter Empirically?, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 553, 556 (2010).

Id.
See id. at 591–92 (defining the “civil rights” category but not indicating whether any of
the cases were voting rights or election law disputes).
105
106
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were 1.71 times greater under Iqbal than under Conley.”107 The updated study also affirmed the disproportionate effect Twombly and
Iqbal have had on constitutional civil rights cases.108
Another study, conducted shortly after Twombly (but before
Iqbal) similarly concluded that Twombly has had an impact on civil
rights cases—although this study also did not state whether the “civil
rights” category included any voting or election law claims.109 The regression analysis showed that a court was 39.6% more likely to dismiss
a civil rights case than a random case in the studied set.110 Much like
the other commentators, this researcher lamented that “[i]f the lower
courts are, as this study suggests, applying the Twombly language in
such a way as to impose a higher burden on civil rights plaintiffs, the
practical effect of this reality is to close the courts to a large number of
plaintiffs.”111 A study conducted using a different empirical model
found that “the rules of Iqbal and Twombly pose the potential to
eliminate cases that have better than a 50% chance of being successful.”112 Finally, one researcher found that dismissals of claims for factual insufficiency have increased but dismissals for legal insufficiency
have decreased after Iqbal, showing the effects of the Court’s focus on
factual plausibility in all cases.113
Additional research has considered the Twombly or Iqbal effect
on various substantive areas, many of which involved civil rights issues
such as disability claims, employment discrimination, and housing discrimination.114 The results have all confirmed that Twombly and Iqbal
have negatively impacted plaintiffs’ ability to vindicate their rights.
No scholar, however, has looked at the impact of Twombly and Iqbal
specifically on election law litigation, separate from the general cate107 Patricia Hatamyar Moore, An Updated Quantitative Study of Iqbal’s Impact on 12(b)(6)
Motions, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 603, 605 (2012).
108 Id. at 605, 616–18.
109 Kendall W. Hannon, Note, Much Ado About Twombly? A Study on the Impact of Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly on 12(b)(6) Motions, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1811 (2008).
110 Id. at 1838.
111 Id. at 1846.
112 Alexander A. Reinert, The Costs of Heightened Pleading, 86 IND. L.J. 119, 161 (2011).
Instead of evaluating pre- and post-Twombly/Iqbal dismissals, this study examined the success of
“thinly pleaded” cases from 1990–1999 under Conley’s “no set of facts” standard, which, under
Twombly and Iqbal, would now require dismissal from the outset. Id. at 133–40.
113 See Dodson, supra note 41, at 132.
114 See Raymond H. Brescia, The Iqbal Effect: The Impact of New Pleading Standards in
Employment and Housing Discrimination Litigation, 100 KY. L.J. 235, 239–41 (2012); Joseph A.
Seiner, Pleading Disability, 51 B.C. L. REV. 95, 97 (2010); Joseph A. Seiner, The Trouble with
Twombly: A Proposed Pleading Standard for Employment Discrimination Cases, 2009 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1011, 1014.
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gory of civil rights. The next Part examines the somewhat unique effect of the new pleading regime in election law disputes.
II. TWOMBLY

AND

IQBAL

IN

ELECTION LITIGATION

This Part considers the impact of Twombly and Iqbal on election
law cases from a qualitative perspective.115 There are generally four
main areas of election litigation: redistricting, ballot access, campaign
finance, and election administration (which includes post-election disputes). This Part examines each kind of election law case and discusses how the rules from Twombly and Iqbal operate in each one.116
Ultimately, the descriptive analysis shows that Twombly and
Iqbal are insufficient to determine whether a plaintiff has a potentially
valid claim and therefore properly pleads an election law violation.
That is, Twombly and Iqbal do not ask the right questions for election
cases, demonstrating the need for an additional pleading test to supplement this area of the law.
The recent message lower courts seem to be gleaning from the
Supreme Court, however, is that district courts should use Twombly
and Iqbal in every Rule 12(b)(6) case.117 Conducting a Twombly/Iqbal
analysis for every election law dispute, however, does not make much
sense, as the plaintiff often does not need to rely on robust factual
findings to win these cases. Instead, election cases frequently involve
the other inquiry in a motion to dismiss, which tests whether, regardless of factual specificity, the plaintiff can recover under the law he or
she invokes. This is not to say that facts are wholly irrelevant in election cases, but that they are not as vital to crafting a valid complaint
because the main question is the legal implication of a particular election practice. Indeed, plaintiffs in election cases should be able to satisfy the factual plausibility test fairly easily in many instances.
115 There are not yet enough post-Iqbal election cases involving a motion to dismiss for a
detailed empirical analysis. A Lexis and Westlaw search for election-related disputes citing
Twombly or Iqbal in 2010, a midterm election year, revealed only twenty-three relevant
matches. Similarly, a related search for the year 2006 looking at election cases invoking the prior
“any set of facts” standard resulted in only twenty-eight cases. More poignant is the manner in
which courts are invoking the new factual plausibility standard in their analysis.
116 Of course, as with any typology, there may be cases that fall within multiple categories
or are of a different form than one of the categories. Specifying the four kinds of election litigation helps to focus the discussion of this substantive area.
117 See generally Rakesh N. Kilaru, Comment, The New Rule 12(b)(6): Twombly, Iqbal, and
the Paradox of Pleading, 62 STAN. L. REV. 905, 908 (2010) (suggesting that Twombly and Iqbal
“mark out a new era of pleading practice far less charitable to plaintiffs and rewrite several
Court precedents on pleading and practice in the civil rights context”).
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As the discussion below demonstrates, district courts in election
cases are trying too hard to use Twombly and Iqbal’s factual plausibility standard, failing to realize that the analysis from these cases does
not help much in the election setting. Courts are thus often stuck attempting to hew to the Twombly/Iqbal line while failing to employ the
doctrine faithfully, dismissing cases for factual insufficiency when
there are no additional facts a plaintiff could assert. Alternatively,
district judges simply reject (usually implicitly) the factual plausibility
rule, citing the cases but not actually testing the complaint under
Iqbal’s two-part framework. This leaves a gap in how courts are supposed to construe motions to dismiss in these cases.
A. Redistricting
In a redistricting case, plaintiffs challenge newly enacted maps
that states draw after the decennial census. Plaintiffs typically claim
one person, one vote violations,118 racial or partisan gerrymandering,119 or violations under the Voting Rights Act.120 Importantly, each
of these claims has well-established rules to determine liability. For
example, to prove minority vote dilution under section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act, a plaintiff must satisfy the three Thornburg v. Gingles
“preconditions” and demonstrate that, under the totality of the circumstances, the political process is not open to participation by minorities because the map precludes minority voters from electing
representatives of their choice.121 Under Conley’s notice-pleading
standard, a complaint would have to provide merely enough factual
information about the districting to suggest the map’s invalidity. As
the D.C. Circuit explained:
In order to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6),
appellants were required only to allege that the Ward Redistricting Act dilutes minority voting strength such that minority voters in the relevant wards have “less opportunity than
other members of the electorate to participate in the political
process and to elect representatives of their
choice.” . . . Appellants were not required on the face of
118

See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).

See, e.g., Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004) (alleging political gerrymandering);
Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993) (alleging racial gerrymandering).
119

120

See, e.g., League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006).

See Johnson v. DeGrandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1011 (1994) (citing Thornburg v. Gingles, 478
U.S. 30, 50 (1986)).
121
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their complaint to allege every legal element or fact that
must be proven in a vote dilution claim.122
But after Twombly and Iqbal, a bald factual statement alleging
vote dilution is unlikely to pass muster, and in any event, it does not
help the court in deciding whether the case has any merit. This is
because a complaint that states merely that the redistricting “dilutes
minority voting strength” presents a conclusory allegation. Instead,
under the current pleading regime, the plaintiff will have to provide
enough facts to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.123
But what facts are relevant to this inquiry? The plaintiff already has
the legislatively enacted map and can conduct his or her own studies
on minority representation under the new map. Moreover, reciting
the facts about the map’s lines does not go to the real question: does
the map improperly thwart minority representation as a matter of law?
Although certain facts might be relevant to this inquiry, the threshold
question is whether the plaintiff can meet the legal elements of the
claim, which actually presents a mixed question of fact and law.
Twombly and Iqbal therefore do not help much in the redistricting
context: there is little need for a “factual plausibility” showing when a
plaintiff already knows all of the facts to state a claim but must establish that those facts will lead to legal liability. The only time when
factual development might make a significant difference in a redistricting case is when the plaintiff claims that a jurisdiction adopted a
map with a discriminatory purpose,124 as that question goes to the
same issue present in both Twombly and Iqbal: subjective intent. In
that instance, a court would be correct in determining whether the
plaintiff had any factual evidence of the mapmakers’ intent. More
often, however, redistricting cases do not involve intent, but instead
are about the impact or effect of a particular map,125 meaning that the
122 Kingman Park Civic Ass’n v. Williams, 348 F.3d 1033, 1040 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (citation
omitted).
123

See, e.g., Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007).

See, e.g., City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 66–68 (1980) (holding that a plaintiff
must show discriminatory intent to prove that a map violates the Fourteenth Amendment); see
also Michael J. Pitts, Redistricting and Discriminatory Purpose, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 1575 (2010)
(suggesting a framework for courts to consider allegations of discriminatory purpose in newly
passed maps).
124

125 For example, a one person, one vote case, or a vote dilution claim, looks at the effects of
a map on particular constituencies, separate from the state’s motivation for enacting that map.
See, e.g., Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461 (2003) (considering the effect of a new state legislative redistricting in determining whether to grant preclearance under Section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act).
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resolution of the case relies on a legal interpretation of those effects,
not the presence or absence of certain facts.
Consider Herdt v. Civil City of Jeffersonville,126 in which the
plaintiff challenged the city’s redistricting as diluting the strength of
his vote in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.127 The complaint
alleged that the city had drawn new council maps “with disproportionate numbers of citizens in the different councilmanic districts,” in violation of Indiana law and the Equal Protection Clause.128 In analyzing
the city’s motion to dismiss, the court quoted from Twombly and
Iqbal at length regarding the factual plausibility standard and then
concluded:
The Plaintiff’s Complaint does not plead or suggest on its
face that the City has failed to follow any mandate of Indiana
law or that the data used by the City Council was flawed in
any specific manner . . . . [U]nder the holdings in Iqbal and
Twombly above, when pleading an equal protection claim
under the Constitution, the Plaintiff must do something more
than mere notice pleading and must plead facts which are
sufficient to establish that there is a plausible claim for dilution of votes, not merely a theoretical claim. Because the
Plaintiff has not at this time pled an appropriate plausible
claim, the Motion to Dismiss is granted.129
The problem with this analysis is that there were no other facts
for the plaintiff to plead, and yet the plaintiff still might have asserted
a legally valid cause of action. That is, the court made two mistakes: it
was wrong in its application of Twombly and Iqbal because the facts
the plaintiff asserted regarding the effects of the map were plausible
on their face, and it should not have stopped the analysis there because it did not answer the question of whether the plaintiff might
have had a legally viable claim. The plaintiff met the Twombly and
Iqbal standard because he provided all of the relevant facts that he
could: the map, as enacted, contained districts of unequal population.
There was nothing more the plaintiff could assert that would make the
factual allegations more plausible, as the map was enacted with the
lines and effects as the plaintiff stated. What we do not know is
whether, under those facts regarding the effect of the map, the City
126 Herdt v. Civil City of Jeffersonville, No. 4:10-cv-140, 2011 WL 1600518 (S.D. Ind. Apr.
27, 2011).
127 Id.
128 Complaint ¶¶ 10, 12, Herdt v. Civil City of Jeffersonville, No. 4:10-cv-140, 2011 WL
1600518 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 27, 2011).
129 Herdt, 2011 WL 1600518, at *2.
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violated the Equal Protection Clause in its redistricting as a matter of
law. Did the plaintiff make a plausible allegation that the inequality
in district sizes violated the Constitution? Using Twombly and Iqbal
does not actually help in determining whether the plaintiff had a valid
claim from the start. What the court should have asked was whether,
even if all of the plaintiff’s facts were true, the plaintiff would have a
recognized legal cause of action under the substantive standard appropriate for this case. The court should have either allowed the case to
proceed or dismissed it for failing to state a viable legal cause of action. Analyzing the factual sufficiency of the complaint through
Twombly and Iqbal and then ending the inquiry is insufficient because
there was nothing factually wrong with the complaint.
B. Ballot Access
In cases involving ballot access or candidate nominations, candidates and their supporters challenge state laws that limit eligibility for
the ballot. For example, Ohio has seen continued litigation from the
Libertarian Party over Ohio’s signature-gathering requirements.130
These cases usually arise under the First and Fourteenth Amendments
and consider whether the laws burden the candidate’s and voters’
rights to free speech and association in advancing their beliefs and
voting effectively for a candidate of their choice.131 To win a ballot
access claim, the plaintiff typically must show that the state’s law regulating who may be listed on the ballot imposes a severe burden on the
rights of the candidate’s supporters and is not narrowly tailored to
achieve a compelling state interest.132
Twombly and Iqbal have affected the way in which courts analyze
these cases. In Libertarian Party of Virginia v. Virginia State Board of
Elections,133 for example, the plaintiffs challenged as unconstitutional
a Virginia law that required ballot circulators to live in the congressional district in which they were collecting signatures.134 The court
first recounted the familiar severe burden test applicable to this kind
of case, asking whether the burden the law imposed on the voters sup130 See Libertarian Party of Ohio v. Blackwell, 462 F.3d 579 (6th Cir. 2006); Libertarian
Party of Ohio v. Husted, No. 2:11-cv-722, 2011 WL 3957259 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 7, 2011).
131 See, e.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968).
132 See, e.g., Blackwell, 462 F.3d at 585–86 (defining severe burden standard); see also
Joshua A. Douglas, Is the Right to Vote Really Fundamental?, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
143, 164–65 (2008).
133 Libertarian Party of Va. v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, No. 1:10-cv-615, 2010 WL 3732012
(E.D. Va. Sept. 16, 2010).
134 Id. at *1.

2013]

ELECTION LAW PLEADING

1989

porting the candidate was “severe” or more minimal.135 The court
then determined that the plaintiffs had “not alleged any facts sufficient to establish . . . a discriminatory [severe] burden in this case” and
also had “failed to establish a ‘severe restriction’ on their First
Amendment rights.”136 The court thus rejected the plaintiffs’ complaint under Twombly and Iqbal as failing to “assert a plausible entitlement to relief.”137
But this analysis asks the wrong questions. Instead of determining whether the plaintiffs had presented a sufficient factual description
of the burdens, the court should have considered whether the plaintiffs made a plausible argument that the burdens the plaintiffs did
identify rose to the level of “severe” as a matter of law.138 The court’s
opinion, couched in the factual sufficiency of the complaint, suggests
that the plaintiffs might have survived the motion to dismiss if only
they had asserted more facts.139 But it is unclear what additional factual content the plaintiffs could have provided. If the court meant to
state that the plaintiffs could never prevail because these residency
requirements for ballot circulators are always valid, then the opinion
reads as a summary judgment motion, and the court should have converted the motion to dismiss to a summary judgment motion and allowed the parties to present additional arguments and evidence.140
Alternatively, the court should have said explicitly that the complaint
was legally insufficient and provided reasons for this conclusion—that
the burdens, as stated, were not “severe” as a matter of law.141 Trying
to apply Twombly and Iqbal led to an awkward analysis because it
skirted over the question of whether the plaintiffs actually needed to
provide more facts or if instead the law would not recognize their
cause of action.
C. Campaign Finance
Campaign finance cases have been a recent hot-button issue in
election law. From the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United v.
FEC142 to robust lower court litigation,143 courts have become mired in
disputes regarding the permissible scope of federal and state govern135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142

Id. at *6–7.
Id. at *7 (emphasis added).
Id. at *11.
See id. at *7.
See, e.g., id. at *11.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(d).
See Va. State Bd. of Elections, 2010 WL 3732012, at *7.
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
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ment regulation of money in politics. Once again, a focus on factual
plausibility for a motion to dismiss is incongruent with the main disputes in these cases. Typically, a voter or candidate challenges the
constitutionality of a campaign finance limitation. The law might restrict the amount of contributions or expenditures for a candidate or
political party or require disclosure of the candidate’s or party’s donors.144 Thus, everyone knows what the law does and the limits and
mandates it imposes. The only question is whether the law is legally
invalid. Judges faced with a motion to dismiss should determine if
complaints address this threshold issue.
Courts have at times recognized the difference between factual
and legal sufficiency in campaign finance challenges, but they have
failed to provide guidance on the proper test to apply when the facts
are not in dispute and the case revolves around legal interpretation.
In Schonberg v. FEC,145 for example, the district court did not even
cite Twombly or Iqbal in its Rule 12(b)(6) discussion, instead stating,
“‘[a] Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint’”
and citing pre-Twombly precedents.146 The court then held that the
plaintiff had failed to make a proper legal argument to sustain his
claim.147 The court did not take the bait from Twombly and Iqbal and
consider factual plausibility because the uncontroverted facts were
separate from whether the plaintiff could allege a potentially meritorious claim. Put another way, the plaintiff’s complaint was factually
plausible because the plaintiff pleaded everything possible regarding
the operation of the campaign finance law in dispute. The real question was whether the plaintiff had a valid legal argument. But even
though the court dismissed the complaint for legal insufficiency—
thereby applying a form of legal plausibility—it did so only implicitly,
as it failed to articulate clearly the reason the plaintiff’s complaint was
legally deficient.148 Therefore, while courts might tacitly recognize
that the factual plausibility standard is generally unhelpful for election
law cases, this provides little comfort because a future court may not
be as deft—especially without clearer guidelines on how to undertake
143 See, e.g., Long Beach Area Chamber of Commerce v. City of Long Beach, 603 F.3d 684
(9th Cir. 2010); SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
144 See, e.g., Vt. Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Sorrell, 875 F. Supp. 2d 376 (D. Vt. 2012)
(rejecting challenge to Vermont’s contribution limit and disclosure law for “political
committees”).
145 Schonberg v. FEC, 792 F. Supp. 2d 20 (D.D.C. 2011).
146 Id. at 27 (quoting Browning v. Clinton, 292 F.3d 235, 242 (D.C. Cir. 2002)).
147 Id. at 28–29.
148 See id.
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this inquiry. Moreover, not all courts will resist the current trend of
applying Twombly and Iqbal in every 12(b)(6) case. As discussed below, courts instead should expressly adopt legal plausibility as the
framework for construing this kind of case.149
D. Election Administration
The final category of election cases involves the nuts-and-bolts of
voting and tallying the results. This includes litigation about registration and voter eligibility, the mechanics of casting a ballot, and postelection contests.
Laroque v. Holder150 involved a challenge to the Department of
Justice’s refusal under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act to
“preclear,” or preapprove, a proposed amendment to a city charter
that would have provided for a non-partisan system of electing the
mayor and city council.151 The court spent a paragraph setting out the
applicable standard for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, citing both
Twombly and Iqbal and identifying the “‘two-pronged approach,’
under which a court first identifies the factual allegations that are entitled to an assumption of truth and then determines ‘whether they
plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.’”152 In the discussion
section later in the opinion, however, the court made no mention of
the complaint’s factual allegations or the plausibility standard.153 The
court did not even use the word “plausible” at all in its Rule 12(b)(6)
discussion. Instead, the court considered the plaintiffs’ “ability to
state a viable cause of action.”154 This sounds nothing like determining whether plausible factual allegations support the cause of action
but instead is an analysis of the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Citing to Twombly and Iqbal for the proper standard produced an opinion that was internally inconsistent.155 That is, without a better
standard for how to test the legal sufficiency of a complaint, the court
followed the trend of at least citing Twombly and Iqbal for every
12(b)(6) case, even if that test did not make sense in the context of the
See infra Part IV.
Laroque v. Holder, 755 F. Supp. 2d 156 (D.D.C. 2010).
151 Id.
152 Id. at 164–65 (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009)).
153 Id. at 183–87.
154 Id. at 183.
155 See id. at 164–65; see also Brody v. N.C. State Bd. of Elections, 3:10-cv-383, 2011 WL
1843199, at *3–4, *10 (W.D.N.C. May 16, 2011) (granting Rule 12(b)(6) motion because “the
claims [were] legally insubstantial,” even though the court invoked the factual “plausibility standard” in reciting the mode of analysis).
149
150
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dispute. The court’s analysis exhibited an incongruence present in
election cases when courts try to use the latest Supreme Court pleading precedents. Twombly and Iqbal have blinded district courts, leading to confusion for election litigants about what they must put in
their complaints and how courts should analyze them.
Post-election challenges present a slightly different scenario.
These cases involve election irregularities, such as disagreements over
whether to count certain absentee or provisional ballots.156 Typically,
these disputes remain within the province of state tribunals such as
legislatures, courts, or specially created panels, and each state has detailed provisions for how to resolve election contests.157 A specialized
rule for initiating an election contest might make sense depending on
which tribunal a state chooses to hear the case. But occasionally those
challenging the certified election results bring suit in federal court,
thus implicating federal pleading standards.
For example, in Price v. New York State Board of Elections,158
plaintiffs challenged a New York law that prohibited voters from voting by absentee ballot for political party county committee elections,
even though state law allowed absentee ballots for all other elections.159 Plaintiffs filed their complaint four days before the 2006 primary election.160 The district court granted a temporary restraining
order that required the county elections board to permit voters to cast
an absentee ballot for a particular district, but ordered that the elections board not count these supplemental ballots unless and until the
court allowed it.161 The court ultimately granted the defendant government’s motion to dismiss and denied the plaintiffs’ summary judgment motion.162 But because the district court stayed its judgment
pending appeal, the county board did not declare a winner in the district, and the outcome of the election depended on whether the
county board counted the absentee ballots.163
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in
reversing, mentioned in passing the Twombly standard for construing
156 See, e.g., Hunter v. Hamilton Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 635 F.3d 219 (6th Cir. 2011); In re
Contest of General Election, 767 N.W.2d 453 (Minn. 2009).
157 See Joshua A. Douglas, Procedural Fairness in Election Contests, 88 IND. L.J. 1 (2013)
[hereinafter Douglas, Procedural Fairness].
158 Price v. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections, 540 F.3d 101 (2d Cir. 2008).
159 Id. at 103–04.
160 Id. at 105.
161 Id.
162 Id. at 106.
163 Id. at 106–07.
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a motion to dismiss.164 But beyond paying lip service to whether “the
facts as alleged are insufficient to ‘raise a right to relief above the
speculative level,’”165 the court did not discuss the facts from the complaint. Instead, the court engaged in a legal analysis of whether the
New York law imposed a severe burden that the State could justify.166
This case demonstrates once again how the factual plausibility standard is typically unhelpful for election law because there are often few
factual disputes at the pleadings stage. Instead, the court focused on a
summary-judgment type analysis in ruling the law unconstitutional.
There was less dissonance in this case because the plaintiffs had in fact
moved for summary judgment.167 But the court’s analysis was flawed
because it stated the Twombly standard for a motion to dismiss but
seemed to apply a different test—without identifying precisely what
that test was.168 This case provides little guidance for how a district
court should analyze a defendant’s motion to dismiss in a future election case in which there is not also an accompanying summary judgment motion.
*

*

*

This descriptive analysis demonstrates that most district courts
struggle in applying Twombly and Iqbal to election cases. Some
courts improperly fault plaintiffs for not bringing forth enough facts
when there are no other facts to present. Other courts try to pigeonhole their decisions into Twombly and Iqbal by citing to those cases
and the standards they espouse. But the application of those cases
becomes awkward because in reality the factual plausibility test usually does not answer the question of whether plaintiffs in election
cases have a valid cause of action. The Supreme Court’s recent admonitions regarding the factual sufficiency of a complaint do not mesh
with the way in which election cases actually proceed. To achieve congruence in pleading election cases, we need an updated rule that takes
into account both the goals behind pleading laws and the main characteristics of an election lawsuit.

164 Id. at 107 (citing ATSI Commc’ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 98 (2d Cir.
2007) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 555 (2007))).
165

Id. (quoting ATSI Commc’ns, 493 F.3d at 98 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555)).

166

Id. at 107–12.

167

Id. at 106.

168

Id. at 107.
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ELECTION CASES

Election law cases have unique procedural features that impact
the best pleading rules to adopt for this area. This Part identifies the
salient procedural aspects of an election lawsuit that, when combined,
make election disputes different from many other civil cases. These
features of election law cases suggest that the normal factual plausibility standard is asking the wrong question in election litigation. This
Part also identifies several goals we should promote in crafting pleading rules for election disputes. Understanding the procedural
processes of election litigation is important for discerning a proper
pleading standard for initiating a case. A refined pleading regime for
election law disputes also could apply to other areas that might share
these traits.
A. Common Traits of Election Law Cases
There are four main characteristics common to most election litigation: a governmental entity or governmental official is almost always the defendant; factual development is usually not very robust, or
at least is not of the type that will uncover information a plaintiff
might need to initiate a case; judges, rather than juries, render the
final decisions, usually through pretrial proceedings; and, with some
minor exceptions, settlement is rare.
1. Government as Defendant
Most election lawsuits involve as a plaintiff an individual voter or
candidate, a political party, an interest group or other organization, or
even the federal government, who sues a local, state, or federal entity
or official, and challenges an election practice as unlawful. This is different from virtually all other substantive areas of law, in which the
defendant could be either a government or a private organization, entity, or individual.169 For example, an individual voter might sue a
state (or the state’s official in charge of the election) to challenge its
photo identification requirement.170 A candidate might allege that a
169 Administrative cases typically involve a governmental unit as a defendant, but administrative law is not necessarily a specific substantive area. See, e.g., Gillian E. Metzger, Ordinary
Administrative Law as Constitutional Common Law, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 479, 484–85 (2010). In
addition, school finance cases are most often against governmental units funding schools. Molly
Townes O’Brien, At the Intersection of Public Policy and Private Process: Court-Ordered Mediation and the Remedial Process in School Funding Litigation, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 391,
401–02 (2003).
170 See, e.g., Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008).
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state is unlawfully keeping him or her off of the ballot.171 A political
party could challenge a state’s designation of party preference on a
ballot.172 An interest group, such as an organization that wishes to
spend money on an election, could argue the unconstitutionality of a
federal campaign finance law.173 And the Department of Justice could
bring an enforcement action against a state or municipality for failing
to comply with a statutory command such as the Voting Rights Act,
the National Voter Registration Act, or the Help America Vote
Act.174
With a few exceptions, the defendant in these cases is always the
government or governmental officials, as the governmental entity administers elections and therefore is the only potential “bad” actor.175
This distinguishes election law because in most other cases the “bad”
actor could be either the government or a private party.176 Private
See, e.g., Nader v. Keith, 385 F.3d 729 (7th Cir. 2004).
See, e.g., Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442 (2008).
173 See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
174 Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 3, 42 U.S.C. § 1973a (2006); National Voter Registration
Act § 11(a), 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-9 (2006); Help America Vote Act of 2002 § 401, 42 U.S.C.
§ 15511 (2006).
175 Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953), which is one of the “White Primary Cases,”
presents an exception. In that case, the defendant, Mr. Adams, was the president of the Jaybird
Democratic Association, a political organization which excluded African Americans from its
primary. See id. at 464. The winner of the Jaybird’s primary virtually always won the Democratic primary and then the general election. Id. at 461. The Court held that the Jaybird Democratic Association’s action in excluding African Americans was unlawful given that the
organization was, in essence, picking the ultimate winner. See id. at 476–77. Thus, the Court
determined that the Jaybird Democratic Association was a “state actor” for purposes of running
the only election that really mattered. See id. at 474–76; see also United States v. Brown, 494 F.
Supp. 2d 440 (S.D. Miss. 2007) (involving suit against Chairman of the Noxubee County Democratic Executive Committee for violations of the Voting Rights Act in the administration of the
Democratic Party primaries).
These cases demonstrate that there is no per se rule that a governmental unit or official
must always be the defendant in an election case. Nevertheless, the fact that there are exceptions is less important than the general observation that defendants are almost always the governmental actor responsible for administering elections. Indeed, in United States v. Brown, the
court refused to dismiss the local Election Commission as a party even though it found no liability against it because “its presence [may be] needed in order to afford a complete remedy”
against the Chairman of the County Democratic Executive Committee who had violated section
2 of the Voting Rights Act. Brown, 494 F. Supp. 2d at 486. Thus, I do not argue that it is
impossible to sue a nongovernmental actor in an election case, but it is exceedingly rare not to
have a governmental unit as part of the suit.
176 In cases under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) or Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403
U.S. 388 (1971), a private entity may be considered a state actor. See generally Wilson R. Huhn,
The State Action Doctrine and the Principle of Democratic Choice, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1379
(2006) (explaining the purpose and rationale behind the state action doctrine). Election cases,
however, often do not rely on the state action doctrine because the government or governmental
official is usually the only possible defendant. That is, the state action doctrine need not apply as
171
172
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parties are rarely defendants in civil election cases. Even if the named
defendant is someone else, such as the opposing candidate, the de
facto defendant is a governmental official who is charged with administering the election or counting the ballots.177 Typically, the only
election case in which someone other than a governmental actor is a
defendant is a criminal action involving election fraud.178
Defendants in these cases—governmental entities or officials
charged with carrying out an election—usually have only a single interest: running a fair, smooth, and fraud-free election.179 Defendants,
as the ones being sued, will almost always advocate that the court
should uphold the statute or governmental action under review. Of
course, various government entities advocate policy positions on any
number of election rules. But when the government is the defendant
in election litigation, it obviously will ask the court to reject the challenge to its electoral practices.180
This observation might simply be a tautology: the government administers an election, so the only entity for a plaintiff to sue about
election impropriety is the government. But it is an important characteristic to recognize when contemplating procedural rules for election
law disputes, especially if we use general pleading rules for these
cases. That is, the special feature of elections as always governmentrun, and thus election litigation as always against a governmental enoften to election law because there are rarely private entities serving a governmental purpose in
administering an election. See Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 659, 663 (1944) (holding that a
political party’s primary election constitutes state action but explaining that elections fall under
the authority of the state rather than private entities); see also United States v. Classic, 313 U.S.
299, 314–15 (1941) (explaining that actions of state and local election officials are considered
state actions).
177 In Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), for example, the original defendant was Kathryn
Harris, the Florida Secretary of State, and Al Gore challenged her decision to certify Florida’s
electoral votes for George W. Bush. See Gore v. Harris, No. 00-2808, 2000 WL 1770257 (Fla.
Cir. Ct. Dec. 4, 2000). Bush was substituted as a named party when the case reached the U.S.
Supreme Court. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
178 See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 510 F.3d 714 (7th Cir. 2007) (reviewing a criminal
conviction involving election fraud); United States v. Turner, 465 F.3d 667 (6th Cir. 2006)
(same); United States v. Slone, 43 F. App’x 738 (6th Cir. 2002) (reviewing conviction for vote
buying).
179 See Saul Zipkin, Democratic Standing, 26 J.L. & POL. 179, 183 (2011) (noting that “a
distinguishing characteristic of election claims is that they are often structural constitutional
claims against state defendants”).
180 See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 402 n.7 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(“Like every litigant, the Government would prefer to win its case outright; failing that, it would
prefer to lose on a narrow ground.”); Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 191
(2008) (“The State has identified several state interests that arguably justify the burdens that
SEA 483 imposes on voters and potential voters.”).
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tity, calls into question whether general procedural rules make sense
for this area.
A procedural pleading rule for election cases should take into account the fact that these cases typically involve a governmental actor
as the defendant, and the government’s interest is almost always to
maintain the status quo in running the election. Importantly, because
the government is the defendant, the notice-giving function of a complaint is less important than in other cases, as the governmental entity
running the election knows how the challenged law operates. What
the government defendant may not understand from the beginning of
litigation is why the operation of that practice is allegedly unlawful.
This suggests that a plaintiff should have to identify, at an early stage,
the precise election regulation being challenged and the reasons why
the court should interfere with the way in which the government administers an election.
2. Limited Factual Development
Election litigation often does not require detailed factual findings, as the cases are usually about the lawfulness of an election practice and not about disputes over what happened. Accordingly,
election plaintiffs typically do not need to rely on the government defendant for factual information that would enable the plaintiff to
make out a prima facie case.
In pre-election lawsuits, the parties will want to gather evidence
regarding the burden of a law on the plaintiff or those like the plaintiff, such as evidence on whether the government may restrict certain
people from voting or must place a candidate on the ballot. But the
plaintiff usually does not need to obtain information from the government defendant to develop his or her own case. For example, in the
photo identification litigation from Indiana that eventually reached
the Supreme Court, the parties (the plaintiffs who challenged the law
and the State of Indiana) engaged in limited discovery specifically regarding the burden on certain voters in obtaining photo identification.181 This is unlike discovery in typical civil cases that is focused on
the underlying factual events that gave rise to the suit. Moreover, the
factual development in the photo ID case was largely plaintiff-driven,
in that the plaintiffs unilaterally obtained affidavits from voters re181 See Ind. Democratic Party v. Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d 775 (S.D. Ind. 2006), aff’d sub
nom. Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd, 472 F.3d 949 (7th Cir. 2007), aff’d, 553 U.S. 181
(2008).
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garding the difficulty of obtaining an ID.182 The main discovery that
the plaintiffs sought from the State was information about the extent
of fraud that existed in Indiana, which went to the State’s justification
for the law.183 The State also presented affidavits of its own regarding
the enforcement of the voter ID law.184 Thus, the plaintiffs’ discovery
was less about obtaining evidence from the defendant to assert the
facts about what happened and more about learning the other side’s
substantive defenses. Put differently, the plaintiffs did not need any
information that was solely in the State’s possession to draft a viable
complaint.
Similarly, in a challenge to a redistricting plan, such as a case invoking one person, one vote or vote dilution, the plaintiff usually does
not require information exchange to develop a case, at least at the
outset.185 In the initial three-judge district court decision involving
Texas’s 2003 mid-decade redistricting, for example, there was little necessity for the plaintiffs to obtain information from the State to have
enough facts for their lawsuit.186 The plaintiffs could rely on their own
studies or analysis to allege unlawful gerrymandering. In any event,
the defendant’s evidence, through testimony at the hearing, was
mostly relevant to the State’s proffered justification for the redistricting, not to the underlying elements of the plaintiffs’ cause of action.187
Post-election contests are a little different, and because of their
posture they may warrant their own unique pleading rules. In a postelection dispute about who won, discovery usually consists of obtaining information about the eligibility of particular ballots or providing the court with information regarding the standards used to accept
or reject certain votes. The disputed 2008 U.S. Senate election from
Minnesota presents a good example of the kind of discovery necessary
for an election contest.188 The court explained that the parties had
182

Id. at 791–92 (describing affidavits the plaintiffs filed from various individuals).

Id. at 792–93 (discussing a response to interrogatories in which the State conceded it did
not have evidence of in-person voter fraud in Indiana).
183

184

Id. at 794–95.

If, however, the plaintiff alleges discriminatory purpose or intent, then the government
defendant might possess evidence that the plaintiff needs to make its initial case, as the question
will include an issue over the map drawers’ subjective intent. See, e.g., City of Mobile v. Bolden,
446 U.S. 55 (1980); Texas v. United States, 887 F. Supp. 2d 133 (D.D.C. 2012), vacated and
remanded 133 S. Ct. 2885 (2013).
185

186 See Session v. Perry, 298 F. Supp. 2d 451, 471–72 (E.D. Tex. 2004), vacated and remanded sub nom. Henderson v. Perry, 543 U.S. 941 (2004).
187

Id.

188

Trial Order, In re Sheehan v. Franken, No. 62-CV-09-56, 2009 WL 981934 (Dist. Ct.
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submitted “1,717 individual exhibits,”189 many of which related to the
written materials about voting absentee in the state, the training of
election workers, and the efforts to determine which absentee ballots
the state had counted.190 This is likely information the plaintiffs could
not have obtained on their own without discovery, demonstrating how
election contests are often different in kind than other election
disputes.
From the perspective of the factual allegations needed to initiate
a case, election contests are unique from other election challenges for
two main reasons. First, the underlying issues are typically more fact
based than a pre-election dispute about a particular election practice.
As opposed to a legal challenge regarding the operation of an election
regulation, the determination of the winner is usually dependent on
whether certain ballots are valid and whether those ballots clearly
identify a chosen candidate—both fact-laden questions.191 Second, in
all fifty states, separate statutes explicitly govern the procedures for
election contests.192 Indeed, many election contests do not even go to
the judiciary.193 That is, election contests often operate under a completely different statutory scheme, which makes the comparison to
other kinds of lawsuits harder.
The Supreme Court has explained that “[t]he discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure . . . are designed to encourage open exchange of information by litigants in federal
courts.”194 But election litigation—particularly a pre-election dispute
about an issue of election administration—does not require much exchange of information that the other side does not already have to
enable a plaintiff to start the case, as the evidence is often publicly
available or generated by the parties themselves through affidavits or
Minn. Apr. 13, 2009). This case is commonly known as Coleman v. Franken after the two candidates involved, Norm Coleman and Al Franken.
Id. ¶ 24.
See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 33, 36, 37, 41, 47, 57, 71, 72, 76.
191 See Edward B. Foley, How Fair Can Be Faster: The Lessons of Coleman v. Franken, 10
ELECTION L.J. 187, 190–91 (2011); see also, e.g., Di Benio v. Panaro, 230 N.Y.S. 2d 642, 645 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1962).
192 See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 209.021 (2012); see generally Douglas, Procedural Fairness,
supra note 157 (describing the various procedures for election contests among all fifty states and
across types of elections).
193 See Douglas, Procedural Fairness, supra note 157, at 8. As just one example, several
states have a nonjudicial body decide election contests for gubernatorial elections. See N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 665:5 (2008); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 17-7-5(a)(11) (2011); S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-17250 (2012).
194 Baldridge v. Shapiro, 455 U.S. 345, 360 (1982).
189
190
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studies. To be sure, the parties eventually must obtain this information from the other side to understand the arguments against them
and prepare their own arguments in response. But unlike in the more
typical Twombly or Iqbal context, the parties do not necessarily need
evidence that is only in their opponent’s possession to make out their
initial case.
What does this mean for election law pleading? One common
criticism of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Twombly and Iqbal is
that the Court cut off the ability of plaintiffs at the outset to engage in
discovery to gather evidence and thereby develop their case.195 That
is, it is impossible for a plaintiff to assert a claim that is factually plausible under a heightened standard without obtaining some information from the defendant through discovery. But in election law cases,
the plaintiff usually does not need much information from the defendant to state a factually sufficient claim. Instead, the plaintiff will
most often rely on his or her own studies or evidence regarding the
burden of a particular election law or practice. Moreover, the focus of
the lawsuit is on the law, not the facts, because the facts are often not
in dispute. If anything, discovery in election cases is most useful to
understand and respond to the opposing side’s legal arguments, not to
initiate the case. Accordingly, Twombly and Iqbal are not necessarily
bad for election law; they are just insufficient, as they answer only part
of the inquiry—and the part that is often less important to the ultimate resolution of the case. As discussed below, this observation is
important for selecting the proper pleading rules for election litigation
or other cases that share these same characteristics.
3. Pre-trial Resolution of Election Law Cases by a Judge
A third feature of election law cases is that they rarely, if ever,
reach a jury and instead are resolved by a judge before trial. This by
itself does not make election law unique, but it is still important to
recognize when determining the best procedural rules for these cases.
Most of the time, a case is dismissed at the pleadings stage,196 disposed
of through a grant or denial of a preliminary or permanent injunction,197 or decided on summary judgment.198 Certainly, it is possible
195 Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 54–71 (2010).
196 See supra Part II.B.
197 See, e.g., N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. Lopez Torres, 552 U.S. 196 (2008); Hunter v.
Hamilton Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 635 F.3d 219 (6th Cir. 2011).
198 See, e.g., Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193 (2009).
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for some cases to make it to a bench trial—particularly if it is a special
case that requires resolution by a three-judge trial court panel, such as
a redistricting dispute.199 But the more common approach is for a
court to dispose of a case primarily on the parties’ written submissions
and any hearings related to those motions.
That observation means, in turn, that detailed factual findings are
usually not the driving force behind the resolution of many election
law cases.200 Instead, a court focuses on the legal implications of the
electoral scheme under review. Factual findings are relevant mainly
to explain the operation of the law in dispute201 or to determine which
ballots to count in a post-election contest.202 That is not to say that
factual findings are nonexistent or completely irrelevant. Instead, factual findings take on less prominence than the legal conclusions regarding the operation of the law, particularly because the material
facts often are not in dispute. As the previous section noted, factual
development is muted in an election case, as both sides often will
agree on how a law operates in practice.203 If the main disputes are
legal in nature, then courts can decide them without a drawn-out hearing process.
It is extremely rare to have a jury involved in an election dispute.
In fact, some states explicitly forbid juries to play any role in postelection litigation about the correct winner.204 In other cases, there is
no need for a jury because the parties agree on the facts and focus
their arguments on the legality of the election practice. Thus, from a
structural perspective, resolution of election law litigation is judicial in
nature, in the sense that the judge is the decisionmaker for all issues.
There is little role for a separate factfinder.
199 See, e.g., Perry v. Perez, 132 S. Ct. 934 (2012); League of United Latin Am. Citizens v.
Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006).
200 But see Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234 (2001) (reversing based on lower court’s erroneous factual findings). This case considered whether race was the “predominant factor” in the
redistricting, thus considering the legislature’s underlying intent in passing a new map—an inherently fact-based inquiry. Id. at 240–44.
201 For example, in the Indiana photo identification case, the parties agreed that the law
required all voters to show identification to vote, and the factual findings demonstrated the effect of that law on certain groups of voters. See Ind. Democratic Party v. Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d
775, 792 (S.D. Ind. 2006).
202 The Coleman-Franken dispute, for example, rested in part on determining which absentee ballots to count. In re Contest of General Election, 767 N.W.2d 453, 456–58 (Minn. 2009).
203 See, e.g., Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 782 (1983) (“The facts are not in
dispute.”).
204 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:29-5 (West 2013). But see MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-36-207
(2011) (allowing a judge to empanel a jury to resolve questions of fact in an election contest).
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This is different from run-of-the-mill civil litigation. In a normal
negligence case, for example, a plaintiff must plead that “[o]n date, at
place, the defendant negligently drove a motor vehicle against the
plaintiff.”205 This provides notice to the defendant as to the underlying factual scenario that gave rise to the lawsuit. The parties will then
engage in discovery to determine what actually happened that might
lead to the defendant’s liability. Ultimately, if there are factual disputes, a judge or jury will make findings of fact to resolve the case.
But in election cases, particularly over issues of election administration, there is rarely a need for that factual resolution because the facts
are usually not in dispute. The legality of the election practice is the
crux of the case. It follows that the pleadings should exist to do something more than just tell the defendant (the government) that it could
be liable—because the government will automatically know this simply by having a plaintiff assert a challenge to a law. Indeed, a plaintiff
might need very few facts to initiate a viable election-related lawsuit.
The pleadings should instead set out the legal contentions from the
outset because they will be the main basis for the court’s decision, and
they will determine whether the plaintiff has a plausible entitlement to
relief.
4. Lack of Settlement
A final feature of election litigation is that cases rarely settle.
This contrasts with the trend of most litigation, in which settlement is
the most likely outcome.206 If a plaintiff files suit challenging an election practice, it necessarily seeks a ruling that the practice is unlawful.
The government, defending the law, wants to keep the law intact.
There is usually little middle ground.207 Either the law (or its applicaFED. R. CIV. P. Form 11.
See Kevin M. Clermont, Litigation Realities Redux, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1919, 1956
n.184 (2009) (explaining that current trial levels stand at about one percent, down from about
twelve percent in the 1960s); Jaime Dodge, The Limits of Procedural Private Ordering, 97 VA. L.
REV. 723, 771 n.170 (2011) (citing studies finding that almost two-thirds of cases are settled and
that the rate of settling has increased); Gregg D. Polsky & Dan Markel, Taxing Punitive Damages, 96 VA. L. REV. 1295, 1335 & n.103 (2010) (citing JOHN C.P. GOLDBERG, ANTHONY J.
SEBOK & BENJAMIN C. ZIPURSKY, TORT LAW: RESPONSIBILITIES AND REDRESS 40 (2d ed. 2008)
(stating that “[a]n extremely large percentage of tort cases . . . settle under current law” and
citing a study showing that only three percent of tort cases reach a jury)).
207 This is not to say that we should not encourage negotiation and settlements in election
cases. I have previously advocated for the incorporation of alternative dispute resolution techniques as a mechanism to foster greater civility in election litigation. See Joshua A. Douglas,
Election Law and Civil Discourse: The Promise of ADR, 27 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 291
(2012) [hereinafter Douglas, Election Law and Civil Discourse]. But the reality is that most
election litigation presents either/or questions that make settlement difficult.
205
206
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tion) is or is not permissible. It is hard to fathom a compromise solution in these situations, especially when money is not in dispute.208 It
follows that most cases are resolved through a judicial decision—and,
as noted earlier, one that the judge (not a jury) will resolve. Moreover, the resolution will entail a decision on the substantive legal interpretation, not on competing versions of the underlying facts.
This is not to suggest that settlement is impossible. The Federal
Election Commission (“FEC”) has an Alternative Dispute Resolution
Program, in which it encourages parties to settle complaints before the
FEC through nontraditional enforcement or litigation processes.209
Similarly, the U.S. Department of Justice enters into consent decrees
with state or local governments regarding particular election practices.210 The number of consent decrees appears to have risen in recent years: one commentator found that during the 1990s the DOJ
“obtained orders or consent decrees remedying violations of the Voting Rights Act in three cases,” but that number had increased to more
than thirty during the 2000s.211 An agreement will often specify that
the jurisdiction is not admitting liability but will alter its electoral
practices to fall within the strictures of the particular law.212 Ultimately, the governmental unit agrees to conform its election scheme
to the DOJ’s interpretation of a federal election law to avoid protracted litigation.213
Outside of that narrow context for settlements, however, there is
little room for non-judicial resolution of election law cases. For example, if a plaintiff is challenging a state’s newly enacted voter identification law as unconstitutional, there is likely little wiggle room: the
208 Laurel Brubaker Calkins, Tom Schoenberg & Travis Poling, Texas Voter Map Fight
Eludes Settlement, U.S. Court Is Told, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Feb. 16, 2012), http://www
.businessweek.com/news/2012-02-16/texas-voter-map-fight-eludes-settlement-u-s-court-is-told
.html.
209 See Alternative Dispute Resolution Program, FED. ELECTION COMMISSION (Feb. 2010),
http://www.fec.gov/em/adr.shtml.
210 A list of current DOJ Voting Section Settlements is available at Recent Voting Section
Settlements, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/litigation/recent_settle
ments.php (last visited Oct. 5, 2013).
211 Mark A. Flores, English Only?—The “Power” of Kentucky’s Official Language Statute,
98 KY. L.J. 855, 883 (2009–2010).
212 See, e.g., Lawyer v. Dep’t of Justice, 521 U.S. 567, 572 (1997) (approving redistricting
settlement agreement that disclaimed any unconstitutionality but still redrew the legislative lines
in Florida).
213 See, e.g., Memorandum of Agreement Between the United States of America and Shannon Cnty., S.D. (Apr. 23, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/sec_203/docu
ments/shannon_moa.pdf (detailing the changes Shannon County would make to its language
assistance voting practices to comply with the Voting Rights Act and Help America Vote Act).
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plaintiff is not going to be satisfied with a ruling other than one striking down the law, at least as applied to that voter, and the state is
going to argue in favor of the application of the law.214 Indeed, a
Texas court recently cajoled the parties in a redistricting dispute to try
to reach a settlement to no avail.215 Similarly, it is extremely difficult
to fathom a satisfactory compromise resolution to a post-election contest regarding the correct winner.216 Of course, there can be mini-settlements within a particular case, such as agreements on whether to
count certain ballots but not others.217 But an overall nonjudicial resolution of an election case is unlikely because there is little give-andtake for the parties to offer.
The upshot is that parties’ initial submissions in an election case
take on heightened importance given that a court will finally resolve
almost all disputes. Plaintiffs are unlikely to initiate an election challenge with the ultimate goal of coercing a settlement, as might be the
situation with a private tort or contract case—which was one of the
concerns that animated the Court’s adoption of a heightened pleading
standard in Twombly and Iqbal.218 Obtaining monetary damages is
almost never the goal in election litigation, so there is less concern
that a plaintiff will bring an election challenge without truly wanting
judicial resolution. The lack of settlement, combined with the rarity
of a jury trial in an election case, means that the judge will decide the
dispute one way or the other largely based on the parties’ written submissions. The pleadings thus take on a role beyond just providing notice to the defendant and the court as to the nature of the suit. They
become part of the legal arguments the court will consider as it necessarily decides the case on the merits.
This section has highlighted four procedural features of election
law litigation: the government or a governmental actor is almost always the defendant; factual development is typically not very robust;
See, e.g., Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008).
See Perez v. Perry, 835 F. Supp. 2d 209 (W.D. Tex. 2011) (three-judge court), vacated
and remanded, 132 S. Ct. 934 (2012); see also Cameron Joseph, Texas Redistricting Settlement on
Verge of Collapse, Delaying Primaries, HILL (Feb. 3, 2012, 4:20 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/bal
lot-box/house-races/208607-texas-redistricting-settlement-on-verge-of-collapse-delaying-prima
ries.
216 See Douglas, Election Law and Civil Discourse, supra note 207, at 309. But see Rishi
Batra, Resolving Disputed Elections Through Negotiation, 27 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 371
(2012).
217 See, e.g., Trial Order ¶ 80, In re Sheehan v. Franken, No. 62-CV-09-56, 2009 WL 981934
(Dist. Ct. Minn. Apr. 13, 2009) (“The parties agreed that 933 of the absentee ballots identified by
the counties as wrongfully rejected should be opened and counted.”).
218 See Steinman, supra note 60, at 1295.
214
215
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pretrial resolution by a court without a jury or full fact finding is most
common; and the parties rarely settle. Although any one of these
characteristics might describe other substantive areas, in combination
they separate election litigation from most other kinds of cases. For
example, administrative law disputes also usually have the government as the defendant, but the underlying facts—and thus the discovery process—are more important in resolving the case.219 First
Amendment litigation also might not need a jury trial or full hearings
on the merits, but it is more likely for private parties, serving as state
actors, to be the defendant.220 These features suggest that election litigation—or any other substantive area that might happen to share
these same traits—should have refined pleading rules tied to the
unique features of these cases. That is, any update to the current
pleading regime must take into account the unique traits of election
litigation and the specialized goals and considerations of having the
judiciary involved in running an election.
B. Specific Goals for Pleading Election Law Cases
The features of election cases discussed above, as well as other
structural aspects of election litigation,221 suggest specific goals to consider in evaluating a pleading regime for election law. First, election
law cases require quick adjudication. Election challenges raise inherent timeliness and efficiency concerns that are not present in typical
private disputes.222 Although most private litigants certainly want fast
resolution of their cases, there is no structural reason for quick decisionmaking.223 Election law cases, however, tell the parties how to
administer an upcoming election.224 If the courts do not resolve the
case quickly, the government will not receive the answer on whether a
219 John W. Hardwicke, The Central Panel Movement: A Work in Progress, 53 ADMIN. L.
REV. 419, 438–39 (2001) (“The ALJ must give reasons for every essential element of a decision
and these reasons must be specifically derived from fact, law, and the application of law to
fact.”).
220 See, e.g., Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 507–09 (1946) (holding that the First Amendment protects speech on the sidewalk of a privately owned town); Hall v. Am. Nat’l Red Cross,
86 F.3d 919, 921 (9th Cir. 1996) (explaining that the First Amendment applies to a private entity
that has a “sufficient structural or functional nexus to the government”); see also Jack M. Balkin,
Virtual Liberty: Freedom to Design and Freedom to Play in Virtual Worlds, 90 VA. L. REV. 2043,
2052, 2057–58 (2004) (arguing that the First Amendment should protect freedoms of creation
and design in privately run “virtual” worlds often seen in online gaming).
221 See generally Douglas, Procedure of Election Law, supra note 11 (discussing three different procedural mechanisms under which federal courts decide election-related disputes).
222 See id. at 438.
223 Id.
224 See, e.g., Desena v. Maine, 793 F. Supp. 2d 456 (D. Me. 2011) (holding that Maine’s
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particular election rule is lawful for that upcoming election, and citizens could have their rights curtailed. In addition, there are few viable post-election remedies for a violation of someone’s right to vote.
Once the election passes, there is no way to go back and vindicate the
rights of those who suffered the effect of the challenged law. As I
have argued elsewhere, because of these concerns election litigation
uniquely requires timeliness.225 Pleading rules for election law cases
must reflect this concern.
On the other hand, election cases require heightened accuracy,
perhaps even more so than a regular private dispute. As previously
explained:
If a court is incorrect in a private contract dispute or a tort
case, the parties themselves will be aggrieved and the public
may have a poor view of the courts. But, as a whole, society
will not necessarily suffer unless the rule somehow negatively affects business transactions or has other widespread
consequences beyond that case. Moreover, the courts can
eventually reverse their position on an incorrect legal rule
with little long-term implications. If, however, the courts are
wrong on a matter of election law, there are resulting widespread societal concerns: e.g., the wrong person could be
elected, citizens could be incorrectly denied their right to
vote, or improper influences could taint the election
process.226
Thus, election cases carry a particular concern for accuracy. There is
no way to “go back” and correct a mistake once an election has
passed. This means that the procedural rules for election litigation
must foster the most accurate decisionmaking possible.
Election litigation presents a balance between allowing voters,
candidates, and others to challenge potentially unlawful election practices and a state’s role in administering elections. Under the Constitution, states must regulate the “Times, Places, and Manner” of holding
elections.227 For every election lawsuit, the state potentially cannot
effectively administer its election as it waits for a resolution. Moreover, as Professor Rick Hasen has demonstrated, the amount of election litigation has risen dramatically in the past decade.228 Indeed, one
congressional redistricting was unconstitutional and that the state must redraw the lines before
the 2012 election).
225 Douglas, Procedure of Election Law, supra note 11, at 438.
226 Id. at 439.
227 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
228 Richard L. Hasen, The Supreme Court’s Shrinking Election Law Docket, 2001–2010: A
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goal for election law pleading should be to reduce the amount of nonmeritorious election-related litigation. On the other hand, the Constitution, through the Equal Protection Clause, provides a right against
unconstitutional infringement of the right to vote,229 and voters also
have statutory rights, such as those under the Voting Rights Act and
the Help America Vote Act.230 A pleading system therefore has to
balance these competing concerns: a state’s need to manage elections
with a plaintiff’s ability to vindicate his or her fundamental rights, all
in the context of requiring a faster-than-normal resolution.
Part of achieving this balance lies in weeding out frivolous claims.
But it also requires open access to courts for individuals who are suffering or will suffer an infringement of their right to vote. Thus,
neither Conley’s liberal “no set of facts” standard231 nor Twombly and
Iqbal’s strict factual plausibility rule232 suffice. Both the Conley and
the Twombly/Iqbal standard are too focused on the notice-giving and
factual development features of a complaint.
Most election cases, by contrast, do not necessarily require particularized notice to the government defendant or detailed fact finding
for prompt resolution. As discussed above, Twombly and Iqbal actually impede fruitful analysis of whether a court should dismiss an election case from the outset because they ask the wrong questions.233
Election law needs a supplement to existing pleading rules that recognizes the way these suits operate. The pleading scheme should effectuate the goals of timeliness, accuracy, lack of post-election remedies,
and recognition of both a state’s need to administer an election and an
individual or candidate’s rights to electoral equality. It also must acknowledge the reality of how election litigation proceeds, with a governmental actor as the defendant, little necessity for initial discovery
for a plaintiff to assert a valid legal claim, the primacy of legal arguments over factual contentions, pretrial judicial resolution, and the unlikelihood of settlement. The next Section explains why previously
offered reforms to the pleading problem do not suffice for election
Legacy of Bush v. Gore or Fear of the Roberts Court?, 10 ELECTION L.J. 325, 325–26 (2011); see
generally Richard L. Hasen, The 2012 Voting Wars, Judicial Backstops, and the Resurrection of
Bush v. Gore, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1865 (2013).
229

See, e.g., Douglas, Is the Right to Vote Really Fundamental?, supra note 132.

Voting Rights Act § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006); Help America Vote Act of 2002 § 402,
42 U.S.C. § 15512 (2006).
230

231

Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957).

232

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

233

See supra Part II.
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law. Part IV then proposes a solution that satisfies these
considerations.
C. Previous Proposals for Reforming Twombly and Iqbal—and
Why They Will Not Help Election Law Pleading
Legal scholars lamenting the consequences of the Supreme
Court’s decisions in Twombly and Iqbal for the vindication of individual rights have offered various suggestions to cure the perceived doctrinal defects, but none of them go to the incongruence of applying
Twombly and Iqbal to election law cases. As one commentator explains, there are several possible means of reform:
The judicial and legislative alternatives are those aiming to
accomplish one or more of five things: (1) judicially clarify
plausibility; (2) judicially utilize current Federal Rules that
enable fair case management and screening of claims;
(3) legislatively specify pleading standards for specific claims;
(4) amend the Federal Rules to include claim-specific standards; or (5) amend the Federal Rules to include a uniform
standard that somehow accommodates the discovery and
case management complexities of modern civil litigation.234
The most commonly suggested reforms focus on going back to
the Conley “notice pleading” standard, altering discovery or other
structural litigation processes, or changing the rules for the factual sufficiency of a complaint in a different manner.235
But with respect to election disputes, it is not so much that either
the Conley standard or the Twombly/Iqbal test does or does not work,
but that they are both usually irrelevant for these kinds of cases. As
discussed above, a complaint in an election law case tells the government defendant which electoral practice is being challenged.236 In that
sense, it serves to put the government on “notice,” but it is a different
kind of notice than that contemplated by Conley and notice pleading.
The goal of traditional notice pleading is to tell the defendant the facts
that might give rise to the defendant’s liability.237 An election law
pleading, by contrast, should tell the governmental defendant what
law or election administration issue is purportedly illegal, and why.
234 Ryan Mize, Comment, From Plausibility to Clarity: An Analysis of the Implications of
Ashcroft v. Iqbal and Possible Remedies, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 1245, 1248 (2010).
235 For a useful overview of various proposed reforms, see Ray Worthy Campbell, Getting a
Clue: Two Stage Complaint Pleading as a Solution to the Conley-Iqbal Dilemma, 114 PENN. ST.
L. REV. 1191, 1219–39 (2010).
236 See supra Parts III.A–B.
237 See supra Part I.B.
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Put differently, a complaint that says “On November 6, 2012, I was
improperly denied my right to vote under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments because I did not present identification at my polling
location as required under state law”238 seems factually sufficient to
put the government on notice regarding the allegedly wrongful conduct—refusing to allow the plaintiff to vote because of a lack of photo
identification—but it does not give the government notice as to the
legal contentions, which comprise the real substance of the controversy. It instead simply recounts a constitutional right that the defendant allegedly infringed, without any additional information. A
“factual” notice pleading standard therefore does not give the defendant or the court enough information to determine if the plaintiff is
actually asserting a plausible claim. This kind of complaint would
need additional information for the plaintiff to establish how and why
the government defendant infringed the voter’s First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights. Conley’s notice pleading standard does not do
enough to assist the resolution of election law cases.
Using a reformed Twombly/Iqbal standard regarding factual
specificity also would not help. The main concern with Twombly and
Iqbal is that plaintiffs often will not have enough information to allege
a factually plausible claim unless they engage in some discovery, because only the defendant has the relevant factual information.239 This
is particularly true because the paradigmatic Twombly/Iqbal case involves issues of the defendant’s state of mind.240 Twombly and Iqbal
cut off the plaintiff’s ability to secure information from the defendant
through discovery unless the plaintiff already alleges a factually plausible claim. Plaintiffs are thus stuck between needing to assert a factually plausible claim to reach discovery and needing discovery to be
able to allege a factually plausible claim. The difference for election
cases, however, is that most election litigation is not about the exchange of factual information.241 It is instead about the legality of a
particular election rule and how that rule affects certain kinds of voters or other political actors. Thus, facts are not irrelevant, but most
often plaintiffs already have most of the facts they need to allege a
violation, or they can commission a study or hire an expert to obtain
that information. Altering the discovery rules for election law there238

Cf. FED. R. CIV. P. Form 11.

239

See Miller, supra note 195, at 43.

240

See Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, supra note 43, at 459.

241

See supra Part III.A.
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fore would not achieve the balance of streamlining the pleading process while still giving plaintiffs the ability to vindicate their rights.
What is missing from these solutions is the recognition that, even
at the pleadings stage, an election law case is more about the legal
implication of a particular election rule than the facts of what occurred. Plaintiffs typically do not need information from the government defendant that they cannot obtain without court-ordered
discovery to assert a factually plausible case in the first pleading. Instead, plaintiffs often have all the factual information they need to
bring a claim: the government has a law or electoral practice, and that
practice allegedly infringes on the plaintiffs’ rights in some way. At
most, to allege a factually plausible claim the plaintiff will need to find
his or her own experts or conduct a study on the effect of the law, but
that does not require the government defendant to disclose information through court-ordered discovery. Indeed, most election law complaints should easily meet the Twombly/Iqbal factual plausibility
standard. The real question at the pleadings stage, which courts now
fail to consider explicitly because of Twombly and Iqbal, is whether
the plaintiff has alleged a sufficient legal claim that the government’s
electoral action is unlawful.242 This inquiry implicates the other part
of Rule 12(b)(6), which asks whether the law supports the plaintiff’s
assertion of a legal wrong.243 It is here that the concept of legal plausibility becomes most useful.
IV. ELECTION LAW

AND

LEGAL PLAUSIBILITY

Although Twombly and Iqbal purport to apply to all civil litigation, the factual plausibility standard by itself does not mesh well with
how most election cases proceed. Moreover, Congress has singled out
election disputes for special procedures, demonstrating the need for
quick resolution and clear rules in this area.244 It follows that the manner in which parties initiate election litigation also requires special attention and particularized guidelines that recognize the features of
election law cases. Given the increased scrutiny on pleading standards
for all civil cases in the wake of Twombly and Iqbal, it is time to consider the proper pleading rules for election cases.
This Part proposes a rule for election law pleading; using the lexicon from Twombly and Iqbal, I term it “legal plausibility.” Put simply, legal plausibility requires more detailed pleading of the plaintiff’s
242
243
244

See supra Part II.
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
See Douglas, Procedure of Election Law, supra note 11, at 434.
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legal theories. This approach borrows from and complements
Twombly and Iqbal’s factual plausibility standard, but tweaks it to focus on the legal as opposed to the factual allegations. Instead of testing complaints solely to discern if they plead enough facts to show a
plausible claim for relief, legal plausibility asks whether the complaint
pleads the requisite law to demonstrate a plausible claim of an election wrong to that specific plaintiff. It requires a plaintiff to allege
with sufficient specificity how an election practice will affect the plaintiff unlawfully. In that sense, a legally plausible claim will demonstrate both that the plaintiff has standing to bring the suit and that the
operation of the election practice likely satisfies the elements of the
plaintiff’s cause of action—which is actually a mixed question of law
and fact. Although a complaint for an election law case cannot omit
all facts, factual allegations are less important than the legal assertions
surrounding the operation of the law. This is because most election
complaints should easily meet the standard for factual sufficiency.245
Legal plausibility is a useful supplement to notice pleading and factual
plausibility because it ties more directly to the features of election litigation and the goals behind pleading election cases. Thus, an election
complaint must satisfy both factual plausibility (which should be easy
in most cases) and legal plausibility. Of course, legal plausibility could
apply to other areas that share common characteristics and goals with
election law, such as a primary focus on the law instead of the facts,
the combination of pretrial resolution and lack of settlement, and the
heightened need for both accuracy and timeliness with a corresponding lack of adequate post-litigation remedies. I use the setting of election law to develop and extrapolate how the standard would operate,
and conclude with examples of the legal plausibility test at work for
specific election disputes.
A. Defining Legal Plausibility
The Supreme Court in Iqbal explained that “[w]hile legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.”246 The legal plausibility standard for
election law cases uses this invitation from the Court to allow “legal
conclusions”—or more accurately, sufficiently detailed legal allegations—to serve as the framework of a complaint. But, going a step
further, so long as the plaintiff can explain in the complaint how the
election law at issue plausibly infringes on the rights of that particular
245
246

See supra Part III.A.2.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).
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plaintiff, the complaint should be sufficient, separate from whether
there are detailed factual allegations. Legal plausibility acts as a counterpart to factual plausibility, giving courts the tools they need to determine if an election complaint is sufficient. As noted above, courts
in election cases typically invoke Twombly and Iqbal in dismissing an
election case, even though there are no other facts the plaintiff could
plead and the real question is whether the plaintiff’s claim is legally
sufficient.247 Legal plausibility fills this gap by providing a test for
courts to employ in construing an election complaint that turns on the
legality of the election practice.
A legally plausible claim will have three main elements. First, it
must set out what electoral practice is being challenged. This requirement of law identification is fairly straightforward: the plaintiff must
merely identify what specific law or regulation is allegedly unlawful.
Second, the complaint must explain how that law actually affects the
plaintiff, or put another way, law particularization. In some ways, this
is similar to a requirement that the plaintiff allege at the outset that he
or she has standing to bring the case.248 Finally, and most importantly,
the plaintiff must present the basis for the legal challenge, or law application, explaining how the law in operation satisfies a legal claim
for relief. In essence, the plaintiff must apply the law to the challenged electoral practice using the elements of the cause of action.
This prong recognizes the nature of election issues as presenting
mixed questions of law and fact, with the emphasis on the legal analysis. If a plaintiff can allege plausibly that the application of the challenged rule will likely satisfy the legal elements of a claim, the
complaint is legally sufficient. This section discusses each prong. It
then concludes with a plea for courts to recognize legal plausibility but
also suggests that Congress could pass a new statute defining the legal
plausibility standard for election law cases, similar to what it has done
for prisoner litigation through the PLRA.
1. Law Identification
The first element requires the plaintiff to identify the precise election practice he or she is challenging. This gives the government defendant notice of the basis of the suit. A plaintiff should be able to
identify with specificity what election law or regulation is allegedly
unlawful. This is necessary under Twombly and Iqbal to provide sufficient notice, and there is no reason not to retain this requirement for
247
248

See supra Part II.D (discussing Laroque v. Holder, 755 F. Supp. 2d 156 (D.D.C. 2010)).
See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).
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legal plausibility. Election-related lawsuits involve an electoral law,
regulation, or practice. A complaint that fails to identify with specificity what law or practice the court should review is patently insufficient
to move beyond the pleadings stage. This is also a very easy requirement for a plaintiff to meet.
2. Law Particularization
The second element requires the plaintiff to demonstrate a particularized injury to that plaintiff. This is important because it ensures
that the plaintiff is not challenging a law in the abstract but instead is
tying his complaint to the actual operation of the law. Here the plaintiff must provide some facts to show how the law would impact that
plaintiff, but the tenor of the plaintiff’s factual development is different than in the Twombly/Iqbal context. As opposed to requiring the
assertion of plausible facts regarding what happened (including the
refutation of alternative explanations for the underlying facts or the
pleading of the defendant’s state of mind, as in Twombly),249 this
prong asks the plaintiff merely to demonstrate that the election practice applies in some improper way to that plaintiff directly. The difference is in the focus of the plaintiff’s assertions: instead of needing
detailed facts about the underlying events, the plaintiff would present
an argument that the application of the election practice affects that
plaintiff’s rights in some unlawful way. Law particularization requires
the pleading of an individualized harm. This will help the court identify, as early as possible, precisely what alleged legal wrong is at issue.
Unlike in the Twombly/Iqbal context, then, the plaintiff will either
already have all of the facts he or she needs or the ability to obtain
those facts independently (through studies, expert witnesses, etc.).
In essence, the plaintiff must assert, with specificity, the elements
of standing in the complaint: that the plaintiff suffered (or will suffer)
an actual or imminent injury, that the governmental practice is causing
that injury, and that the court can redress the injury by striking down
the operation of the law.250 Most importantly, this means that the
plaintiff must allege specifically how the law is affecting that plaintiff.
The plaintiff must demonstrate that he or she is suffering a “legally
cognizable” injury.251
249

See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
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See, e.g., Allen, 468 U.S. at 752.
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See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 167 (1997).
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For example, Justice O’Connor cogently explained why plaintiffs
alleging unlawful racial gerrymandering usually must live in the district subject to the challenge:
Demonstrating the individualized harm our standing doctrine requires may not be easy in the racial gerrymandering
context, as it will frequently be difficult to discern why a particular citizen was put in one district or another. Where a
plaintiff resides in a racially gerrymandered district, however, the plaintiff has been denied equal treatment because
of the legislature’s reliance on racial criteria, and therefore
has standing to challenge the legislature’s action. Voters in
such districts may suffer the special representational harms
racial classifications can cause in the voting context. On the
other hand, where a plaintiff does not live in such a district,
he or she does not suffer those special harms, and any inference that the plaintiff has personally been subjected to a racial classification would not be justified absent specific
evidence tending to support that inference. Unless such evidence is present, that plaintiff would be asserting only a generalized grievance against governmental conduct of which he
or she does not approve.252
Law particularization explicitly incorporates this standing requirement into the plaintiff’s pleading burden.
Sometimes satisfying the standing requirement can be difficult in
a case involving an upcoming election, particularly when the precise
identity of who will suffer an injury is unknown until the election actually occurs and the voter is denied the ability to vote.253 But the Court
has granted standing to plaintiffs who assert these kinds of “probabilistic harms,” “framing them . . . as attributable to individual plaintiffs.”254 Asserting a probabilistic harm is tantamount to alleging that
the law presents a heightened risk of impacting that person specifically.255 Similarly, so long as a plaintiff can identify how the law is
likely to affect that plaintiff by articulating a legally cognizable injuryin-fact, the plaintiff will meet the law particularization prong. Standing law—asserted with particularity—serves as a cogent proxy for satisfying this prong of legal plausibility. Moreover, because plaintiffs
already must meet the standing requirements, it makes sense to recog252

United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 744–45 (1995) (citations omitted).
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See Zipkin, supra note 179, at 203.

254

Id.
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Id. at 206.
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nize explicitly the plaintiff’s burden in any pleading regime that is focused on the plaintiff’s legal assertions.
This requirement recognizes what courts already do in their merits decisions in most election law cases, albeit spelling it out explicitly
and requiring it earlier in the process. The Court has increasingly rejected facial challenges to election laws, instead requiring plaintiffs to
demonstrate how the law actually works in practice as applied to that
plaintiff.256 That is, on the merits plaintiffs have generally lost when
they have brought facial challenges to laws involving election administration.257 Instead, the Court has left the door open to as-applied challenges, encouraging piecemeal litigation but refusing to use the
judiciary to mandate wholesale changes in how states administer elections.258 These decisions typically occur at the summary judgment
stage. For example, the Court in Crawford v. Marion County Election
Board259 rejected a facial challenge to Indiana’s voter identification
law in part because none of the plaintiffs had sufficiently asserted that
the law would affect them directly.260 Under legal plausibility, the district court could have granted a motion to dismiss, signaling that the
proper plaintiff would be someone who could demonstrate that the
law would actually infringe upon his or her right to vote. The requirement of law particularization incorporates current practice in election
law, in which a plaintiff must allege that the law in question is invalid
as applied to that plaintiff.261 But it improves judicial resolution because it explicitly requires this showing from the outset of the litigation by placing the burden on a plaintiff to identify how the law is
actually injuring (or is likely to injure) that plaintiff.
Law particularization poses few practical hurdles for a potential
plaintiff because the plaintiff has all of the information he or she
needs to invoke his or her own standing. This prong simply requires
plaintiffs to assert their own standing with particularity and from the
outset. Additionally, it addresses the need for courts to narrow cases
only to those that might have substantive merit as quickly as possi256 See Joshua A. Douglas, The Significance of the Shift Toward As-Applied Challenges in
Election Law, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 635 (2009) [hereinafter Douglas, Significance of the Shift].
257 Id. at 637–38. The Court, however, has been more sympathetic to striking down a campaign finance regulation in its entirety. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010)
(rejecting as-applied challenges and striking down a portion of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform
Act on its face). But see Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013) (striking down a provision of the Voting Rights Act on its face).
258 Douglas, Significance of the Shift, supra note 256, at 639.
259 Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008).
260 Id. at 187.
261 See id. at 200.
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ble—helping to achieve the necessary timeliness that election litigation requires.
3. Law Application
Once the plaintiff has identified the electoral practice in question
and demonstrated how the law produces a particularized effect on
that plaintiff, the final step is to show that the law, as applied, can
plausibly meet the elements of the alleged cause of action. That is, the
plaintiff should discuss its legal theories regarding how the election
practice is unlawful by establishing how the plaintiff will likely meet
the elements of its claim. A legally plausible complaint is one that
couches its arguments as a mixed question of law and fact, or, borrowing from Professor Henry Monaghan, “law application.”262 Professor
Monaghan explains that law application “is residual in character. It
involves relating the legal standard of conduct to the facts established
by the evidence.”263 Given the unique features of election litigation, it
makes sense to require plaintiffs to engage in this law application from
the outset and explain how the operation of the law is legally problematic. Once the plaintiff satisfies the law identification and law particularization prongs, law application would allow a plaintiff to
support his or her complaint by identifying each element of the plaintiff’s claim and asserting how the government’s use of the election
practice likely meets that element.
For example, a plaintiff might want to challenge a state’s requirement that voters show identification at the polls as unconstitutional.
Once the plaintiff identifies the voter ID law in question and shows
how that law affects the plaintiff (because, for example, the voter
plaintiff is unable to obtain an ID and therefore may be ineligible to
vote), this final step requires the plaintiff to apply the legal standard
for unconstitutionality to the law in question. It is well established
that laws that infringe the fundamental right to vote are subject to the
“severe burden” test.264 If the burden on the voter is severe, then the
law must survive strict scrutiny review—that is, the government must
demonstrate that the law is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling
state interest.265 A complaint challenging a voter ID law is legally sufficient if it demonstrates that, as applied to that plaintiff, it is likely
Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 229, 236 (1985).
Id.
264 See, e.g., Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992); see also Douglas, Is the Right to
Vote Really Fundamental?, supra note 132.
265 Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434.
262
263
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that the law imposes a severe burden and that there is no obvious
narrowly tailored compelling governmental interest. Put another way,
for this third prong the plaintiff must demonstrate why the law
presents a severe burden on voters who cannot obtain IDs and why
the government is not justified in imposing this requirement. Importantly, the plaintiff does not have to prove legal liability at this stage;
rather, the pleading must simply show, to a sufficient level, why the
government’s electoral practice is unlawful.266 A plaintiff can meet
this prong by discussing in its complaint the elements it must ultimately satisfy to win its case.
The law application prong of legal plausibility requires a plaintiff
to offer allegations that are directly tied to what the plaintiff ultimately will have to prove to prevail. This is different from both Conley and Twombly/Iqbal. Conley simply required plaintiffs to plead
sufficient facts to put the defendant on notice as to what the case was
about.267 By “retiring” the “no set of facts language” of Conley, the
Court now expects complaints with more factual information about
the underlying events that give rise to the claim.268 Pleading more
facts, however, is separate from the plaintiff’s burden of asserting a
legally sufficient claim—and plaintiffs in election cases should be able
to meet the factual plausibility standard most of the time anyways.
Law application focuses on the legal sufficiency of the complaint, requiring the plaintiff to allege that the way the law operates is unlawful
based on the elements of the cause of action. If the plaintiff can make
a plausible argument that ultimately it will be able to satisfy each element of its claim, then the case should move forward. On the other
hand, if the plaintiff cannot even make a plausible legal argument
266 This requirement is similar to the pleading burden the common law imposes on defamation claimants to make an “innuendo,” which is a reasonable allegation that the statement it is
challenging is defamatory. See GEORGE C. CHRISTIE & JOSEPH SANDERS, ADVANCED TORTS:
CASES AND MATERIALS 495–96 (2d ed. 2012). That is, defamation plaintiffs must allege in their
complaint why they believe the statement meets the legal element of being defamatory. Id. “In
this regard, it is a question for the court, in the first instance, whether reasonable people could so
construe the challenged statement.” Id. Only after the plaintiff meets this initial burden may a
jury answer the question of whether a reasonable person would have actually construed the
statement as defamatory. Id.

In the same sense, under legal plausibility for election cases, it is for the court in the first
instance to pass upon whether the plaintiff can make a plausible claim of legal invalidity under
the facts as stated. If the plaintiff meets that initial burden, the claim can proceed for further
development and an ultimate resolution on the mixed question of law and fact.
267

See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957).

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
556 (2007).
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under one of the elements, there is no point in allowing the case to
proceed.
The three components of legal plausibility are not new. In some
ways they are simply reorganized components of what a plaintiff always must show. But the emphasis on legal arguments, and the mixed
questions of law and fact that are at the crux of election disputes, is
important. By recognizing the significance of the legal sufficiency
question at the outset, courts will be better equipped to handle election cases more quickly and without the doctrinal incongruence that
currently exists.
Legal plausibility allows courts to dismiss election law claims that
have no chance of success. It also gives plaintiffs a better roadmap to
draft more refined complaints. This ensures stability in the election
process, reduces the amount of unnecessary election litigation, and allows meritorious claims to receive robust judicial treatment. Although the concept of “plausibility” is similar to the rule from
Twombly and Iqbal, the standard is different because it focuses on the
development of the legal claim as opposed to the factual sufficiency of
the plaintiff’s allegations. I use the term “plausibility” to align the
doctrine with current Supreme Court jurisprudence, but perhaps it is
better to think of it as simply a heightened focus on legal sufficiency
and the application of the facts to the law in question to tie election
pleading to the main features of most election litigation.
4. Implementation of Legal Plausibility
Given the analog of factual plausibility to legal plausibility, the
best course is for courts to embrace legal plausibility within the preexisting Twombly/Iqbal framework. Courts could recognize that most
election complaints easily satisfy Twombly and Iqbal because that
standard is most relevant when a case turns on the facts, and that legal
plausibility is a separate requirement that makes more sense when the
case focuses on the legal implication of a government-imposed rule. It
answers the legal sufficiency part of the Rule 12(b)(6) analysis—which
is often the main crux of an election case. Yet courts currently have
no standard by which to test a complaint’s legal sufficiency. Legal
plausibility is flexible enough to coincide with Twombly and Iqbal’s
factual plausibility standard because it addresses a different question
for a different kind of case. Accordingly, courts should adopt this new
pleading rule for cases that are not about resolving factual disputes
but instead are more “legal” in nature. Courts could start out by limiting the standard to election law cases, but, as noted earlier, legal
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plausibility could also apply to other substantive areas that share the
same traits as election litigation.
Barring judicial development of legal plausibility, however, statutory action is possible. Congress has previously enacted specific procedural reforms for certain areas, including election law,269 so it is not
outside of Congress’s realm to adopt legal plausibility as part of a new
pleading regime. In promulgating this standard, Congress can look to
the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) as an analog of a statute that focuses on streamlining litigation and quick decisionmaking.270 Under the PLRA, courts must take an initial look, sua sponte,
at any complaints from prisoners against a governmental entity or officer.271 The purpose of this screening is to weed out frivolous cases or
those that fail to state a legally valid claim272 “as soon as practicable.”273 The court then applies the normal Rule 12(b)(6) standard to
the complaint—without waiting for a motion to dismiss from the defendant—and must dismiss complaints that fail to comply with proper
pleading standards.274 A prisoner’s complaint is frivolous if it “lacks
an arguable basis either in law or in fact.”275 For example, a court will
dismiss a prisoner’s case if “it is based upon an indisputably meritless
legal theory.”276
Congress’s goal in passing the PLRA was “primarily to curtail
claims brought by prisoners” because courts routinely dismissed these
claims as frivolous anyway.277 It thus serves as a time- and resourcesaving mechanism to weed out meritless cases, thereby giving courts

269

See supra note 174.

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a) (2006). Similarly, Congress has reformed pleading rules for other
substantive areas, such as heightening the pleading standard for cases involving securities fraud.
See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
270

271 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a) (“The court shall review, before docketing, if feasible or, in any
event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner
seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.”).
272 Id. § 1915A(b) (“On review, the court shall identify cognizable claims or dismiss the
complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint—(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted . . . .”).
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the ability to spend more time on those cases that do have merit.278
One of the reasons Congress singled out prisoner litigation for special
treatment at the complaint stage was because “[p]rison litigation differs substantively from the types of issues and parties typically heard
in civil court,”279 especially given that, much like in election law, the
government is always a defendant in these cases.
In the same vein, courts can review election law complaints sua
sponte to determine if they are legally sufficient because election litigation is different both substantively and procedurally from typical
civil cases.280 Unlike in the prisoner litigation setting, however, the
goal is not necessarily to reduce the number of cases being filed. Instead, the purpose is to speed up the process and ensure that those
cases that are meritorious are not lost in the sea of cases that have no
legal basis, which is particularly important in the time-sensitive period
before an election. It also gives judges and litigants a clear understanding of what exactly an election plaintiff should plead to move the
case forward. It fills a hole in current jurisprudence by providing context and guidance for determining whether an election complaint is
legally sufficient and fixes the incongruence of applying Twombly and
Iqbal to election cases.
Accordingly, assuming the judiciary will not adopt legal plausibility on its own as a counterpart to factual plausibility, Congress should
pass a new statute to set out clear guidelines on pleading an election
law case. As explained earlier, Congress already has singled out election cases as requiring unique procedural mechanisms,281 and election
law cases differ from regular civil litigation in several respects. The
statute should be limited to those cases against a government official
or entity that implicate the running or administration of an election.
Further, although the PLRA mandates that district judges dismiss
poorly pleaded complaints without the defendant first filing a motion
to dismiss, the election law pleading statute should make this discretionary: a district court may dismiss an election law complaint sua
sponte (with leave to amend), but it also could allow a defendant to
file a motion to dismiss if it will assist the court in construing the complaint and if the time and context so allow. This is because election
law cases are often quite complicated, so Congress should not tie the
278 See Caitlin Overland, Note, Permissive Joinder Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act:
More than Just a Procedural Tool, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 289, 296 (2011).
279 Id. at 300.
280 See supra Part III.A.
281 See supra note 174.
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courts’ hands in handling a complaint in the way that makes the most
sense to the court. Instead, the election law pleading statute will give
courts a workable tool—which is missing from current pleading doctrine—to answer the actual question presented in most election-related motions to dismiss: whether the plaintiff’s claim has legal merit.
B. Why Legal Plausibility Makes Sense for Election Law
1. Benefits of the Standard
Legal plausibility provides an interpretative lens through which
to answer the legal sufficiency part of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. It recognizes that election cases require a different kind of pleading than
other civil cases. The standard has at least four main virtues to recommend it.
First, the resolution of legal questions is the most important aspect of election cases, so it makes sense in the election setting for
courts to engage in this activity as soon as they can.282 It is less common for factual findings alone to drive the outcome like they might in
a typical tort or contract dispute, because the mixed question of law
and fact—that is, the legality of the election practice itself—is at the
crux of the issue.283 Most often the court will rule that the election
practice is either lawful or unlawful through a procedural mechanism
such as a motion to dismiss, preliminary or permanent injunction, or
summary judgment.284 It follows that the plaintiff should bear the burden of asserting its legal contentions as early as possible in the litigation so that the court may allow meritorious claims to move forward
and dismiss cases in which the plaintiff’s argument is not even legally
plausible. Improving the ability of courts to recognize which election
cases have legal merit at the earliest instance is perhaps legal plausibility’s greatest virtue, as it allows courts to devote their resources to the
appropriate election cases. Courts must be able to decide election disputes quickly, particularly when an election is imminent. Many plaintiffs may already be making their legal arguments in their complaint.
Legal plausibility allows courts to recognize this explicitly, supplementing the way in which courts construe motions to dismiss, speeding
See Douglas, Procedure of Election Law, supra note 11, at 436.
See, e.g., Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889, 891, 893 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding employment contract’s arbitration clause unconscionable on remand from the Supreme
Court).
284 See Zipkin, supra note 179, at 219–20 (noting that election claims often arise through a
request for preliminary injunction); see, e.g., Obama for America v. Husted, 888 F. Supp. 2d 897
(S.D. Ohio 2012) (granting preliminary injunction to stop Ohio from eliminating early voting for
nonmilitary voters on the last weekend before Election Day).
282
283
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up both the dismissal of nonplausible claims and the legal resolution
of ostensibly meritorious lawsuits.
Second, it makes sense to recognize that election law pleadings
should have a focus beyond notice giving. There is little need for robust notice of what the lawsuit is challenging in an election law case
given that a governmental entity is almost always the defendant.285
When the plaintiff alleges the invalidity of a particular election regulation, everyone knows what law is under review and, accordingly, the
main facts underlying the case. What the government may not know,
however, are the plaintiff’s legal theories. Moreover, requiring solely
a simple factual allegation on how an election law works might encourage litigation because it presents a fairly low threshold for a plaintiff to satisfy; although many courts are dismissing election cases
supposedly under the factual plausibility standard, in reality these
cases are factually sufficient but likely legally flawed.286 The factual
plausibility of most election law complaints would suggest that courts
should be denying motions to dismiss under the current pleading regime. Courts instead are pigeonholing what amounts to a decision
that the plaintiff’s case lacks legal sufficiency through Twombly and
Iqbal’s standard. Pleading rules for election law should reflect what is
actually going on, requiring plaintiffs to present the main legal elements of their case, to a plausible level, in the first pleading.
Third, legal plausibility could provide a useful framework for
courts construing a request for a preliminary injunction. Courts resolve many election cases through preliminary injunctions, not a full
merits trial, especially when the issues arise soon before an election is
to take place.287 But beyond considering generally whether the plaintiff might ultimately win, courts exhibit confusion on the proper standard by which to examine a preliminary injunction motion.288 Courts
deciding whether to grant a preliminary injunction could look to legal
plausibility as a guide to the plaintiff’s burden in demonstrating “a

See supra Part III.A.1.
See supra Part III.A.
287 See, e.g., League of Women Voters of Fla. v. Browning, 863 F. Supp. 2d 1155, 1157 (N.D.
Fla. 2012) (granting preliminary injunction in part to prevent the implementation of Florida law
involving voter registration); Tomei v. Finley, 512 F. Supp. 695, 699 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (granting a
preliminary injunction prior to an election as a result of a campaigning dispute).
288 See generally Bethany M. Bates, Note, Reconciliation After Winter: The Standard for
Preliminary Injunctions in Federal Courts, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1522, 1537–46 (2011) (explaining
the continued confusion among circuit courts regarding the correct standard for considering a
motion for a preliminary injunction).
285
286
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strong likelihood of prevailing on the merits.”289 Preliminary injunctions may present their own unique considerations, but legal plausibility is at least a cogent starting place for providing clarity in that
procedural mechanism. Indeed, the focus of legal plausibility—on
whether the plaintiff has a plausible argument from the outset that the
election law in question violates some constitutional provision or statute—is similar to the preliminary injunction inquiry regarding
whether the plaintiff has a likelihood of success on the merits.290
Finally, legal plausibility is neutral as to the litigants, which is a
significant improvement over the existing standards. Legal plausibility is not plaintiff friendly or defendant friendly in the way we might
consider Conley to be pro-plaintiff and Twombly and Iqbal to be prodefendant.291 Because election litigation does not rely heavily on the
exchange of information through a formalized discovery process,
there is little worry that a rule that requires a particularized legal
showing will harm plaintiffs who otherwise would have meritorious
cases. One of the biggest criticisms of Twombly and Iqbal is that they
cut off the ability of plaintiffs to learn enough information through
discovery to make factually plausible allegations.292 But this concern
is largely absent in election litigation: plaintiffs typically already have
enough information about the operation of the law or can hire their
own experts or conduct their own studies to obtain this information.
None of this must occur through a formalized discovery process that
requires the government defendant to provide information. And political parties or advocacy groups are well positioned to incur any
plaintiff-driven costs. To be sure, the government will have some information that will be useful to the plaintiff in making his or her case
as the litigation moves forward, particularly if the plaintiff’s claim involves proving the legislature’s intent. But it is not essential for the
plaintiff to have this information at the outset to make a plausible
legal claim that the challenged election practice is unlawful.

289 See, e.g., Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 21 (2008); League of
Women Voters, 863 F. Supp. 2d at 1167.
290 The precise scope of how legal plausibility would operate in the context of a preliminary
injunction request is beyond the scope of this Article because preliminary injunctions have their
own unique considerations. See generally Richard R.W. Brooks & Warren F. Schwartz, Legal
Uncertainty, Economic Efficiency, and the Preliminary Injunction Doctrine, 58 STAN. L. REV.
381, 389–93 (2005) (surveying the traditional theories underlying preliminary injunctions and
offering a new approach based on economic efficiency).
291
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Legal plausibility is different from what the Court required in
Twombly and Iqbal. One commentator suggests that, as between factual and legal plausibility, the Court settled on the latter in these
cases:
Under a factual plausibility test, courts would simply ask
whether the conduct alleged was likely to have occurred at
all. For example, a court testing Twombly’s complaint for
factual plausibility would ask whether an antitrust conspiracy
actually existed. By contrast, courts reviewing for legal plausibility would inquire whether the facts alleged in the complaint describe illegal conduct. Thus, a court reviewing
Twombly’s complaint would determine if the alleged conduct
amounted to an illegal agreement. Ultimately, the Court settled on legal plausibility.293
Legal plausibility in that context, however, focuses on the factual
sufficiency of the complaint. In essence, the Court was requiring the
pleading of enough facts to demonstrate the potential for legal liability.294 By contrast, legal plausibility as construed for election cases requires the pleading of enough law, separate from the specificity of
factual allegations, as applied to the particular plaintiff. It is factual
plausibility captured by a rule of law. It goes to the part of Rule
12(b)(6) that asks if the plaintiff has a valid cause of action even if the
plaintiff’s asserted facts are not particularly detailed. As noted above,
a complaint cannot omit all facts, as the plaintiff must demonstrate
how the law affects her particularly. But for legal plausibility, the
plaintiff can simply plead that the application of the election law satisfies each element of the claim, focusing on the legal theories as opposed to the factual development of the record. It requires pleading
the mixed question of law and fact from the outset.
This formulation is not wholly outside of Twombly and Iqbal’s
prescripts. As Professor Steinman suggests, Twombly and Iqbal
merely require that
[a] plaintiff’s complaint . . . provide an adequate transactional narrative, that is, an identification of the real-world
acts or events underlying the plaintiff’s claim. When an allegation fails to concretely identify what is alleged to have hap-

Kilaru, supra note 117, at 910.
See Miller, supra note 195, at 19 (explaining that Twombly and Iqbal “impos[ed] a more
demanding standard that requires a greater factual foundation than previously was required or
originally intended”).
293
294
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pened, that allegation is conclusory and need not be
accepted as true at the pleadings phase.295
Under this “plain pleading” regime, a plaintiff may couch the
complaint’s “crucial elements” in legal conclusions, so long as the
plaintiff plainly identifies the acts and events that give rise to the
plaintiff’s claim.296 Similarly, legal plausibility for election cases requires the plaintiff to state the manner in which the challenged election regulation affects the plaintiff’s rights, as seen through the
elements of the cause of action. Put in Professor Steinman’s taxonomy, legal plausibility requires a “transactional narrative” of the
“real-world” impact of the electoral practice.297 The difference, however, is that the sufficiency of the complaint does not rest on whether
the plaintiff properly pleaded “what is alleged to have happened;” a
legally plausible election law claim need not have detailed factual evidentiary support. Instead, the key inquiry is whether the plaintiff
plausibly explained why the application of the election practice to that
plaintiff is unlawful.298 Put differently, the question is whether the
plaintiff’s case is legally—as opposed to just factually—supportable.
2. Potential Drawbacks
There are, of course, objections to legal plausibility. For one, the
Supreme Court rejected a rule that focuses on legal submissions over
factual allegations. As one commentator states in explaining the
Court’s decision in Twombly,
Nor can the plausibility requirement be viewed as testing the
plausibility of a legal theory. A judge’s job on a motion to
dismiss is to determine whether the legal theory or theories
supporting a complaint are correct, not whether they are
merely plausible. A motion to dismiss would serve remarkably little purpose if the legal basis for the complaint only had
to be plausible rather than correct.299
But requiring a plaintiff to demonstrate how the election rule
plausibly infringes on that plaintiff’s rights is entirely consistent with
the tenor of most election litigation: to determine if a particular law is
valid. In other words, requiring legal plausibility in a case that is
295
296
297
298
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(2010).

Steinman, supra note 60, at 1334.
Id. at 1339–40.
See id.
Id. at 1346.
Edward A. Hartnett, Taming Twombly, Even After Iqbal, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 473, 483
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mostly about the operation of the law parallels requiring factual plausibility in a case that is mostly about the facts, such as a typical tort
case. In a tort case, the plaintiff is first charged with demonstrating
that the allegedly tortious activity actually took place and, only after
establishing what happened, that the conduct amounts to a tort. In
that context it might make sense to require the plaintiff to allege
enough facts to suggest a plausible entitlement to relief in the first
pleading. In the same vein, in an election case the plaintiff ultimately
must demonstrate that the operation of an election law is legally invalid. The plaintiff should therefore present enough legal argument in a
complaint to show at least plausibly that the election practice is unlawful with respect to that plaintiff.
Another concern is that legal plausibility might obscure the distinction between a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) and a summary judgment motion under Rule 56.300 If all that matters in the
complaint is the sufficiency of the legal allegations, then granting a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim looks like a substantive
ruling that “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . .
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”301 Put
differently, how is legal plausibility any different from a plaintiff’s legal memorandum in response to a defendant’s motion to dismiss?
There are four responses. First, legal plausibility comports with a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion alleging that the law does not recognize the
plaintiff’s asserted cause of action. Twombly and Iqbal shifted the discussion of a complaint’s sufficiency too far toward factual plausibility,
misleading lower courts into forgetting to analyze this other component of a motion to dismiss. There is still a role for lower courts to test
the legal sufficiency of a complaint, which is even more important in
cases involving election litigation because they are most often only
about the legal validity of the election practice in dispute.302 Legal
plausibility provides a standard for courts to decide legal sufficiency.
Second, election law cases themselves collapse the difference between legal and factual allegations because unlike in many other kinds
of disputes, legal allegations typically drive the decision. As Professor
Miller explains, the concern with “morphing” a summary judgment
motion into a motion to dismiss is that “this effectively denies any
300 See Miller, supra note 195, at 18, 28, 51–52; see also Suja A. Thomas, The New Summary
Judgment Motion: The Motion to Dismiss Under Iqbal and Twombly, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. 15, 18 (2010) (“The motion to dismiss is the new summary judgment motion.”).
301
302

FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c).
See supra Part III.A.
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hope of investigating and properly developing [the plaintiffs’] claims,
and leads to judicial decisionmaking without a meaningful record.”303
But the ultimate resolution in an election law case usually does not
depend on facts that the plaintiff could not glean absent court-ordered
discovery. Instead, the case is most often about the impact of the law
on the plaintiff and whether that effect is itself unlawful. This inquiry
is factual in nature, to be sure, but it is unlike cases that rely on facts
that a plaintiff uncovers during discovery in regular civil litigation regarding what occurred. Thus, there should be little concern with requiring plaintiffs to satisfy a burden to plead legal arguments at the
pleadings stage when the final resolution is dependent on the plaintiff’s ability to demonstrate the election practice’s invalid impact as a
question of law.
Further, legal plausibility is not simply a return to the days of
code pleading and demurrer, which “focused exclusively on the legal
sufficiency of the plaintiff’s statement of each substantive element of a
cause of action, and did not involve a judicial assessment of the case’s
facts or actual merits.”304 Including the law particularization and law
application prongs avoids the rigid pre-Federal Rules code pleading
standards. This is because the law particularization and law application prongs require the plaintiff not simply to recite the elements of
the cause of action but to apply the facts of the plaintiff’s circumstance
to the challenged law. The plaintiff must explain how the facts operate within the legal framework of the case. The plaintiff’s assertions
might be nonfactual in nature, but they also cannot simply contain a
list of the elements of the cause of action. In fact, legal plausibility
recognizes that the distinction between factual allegations and legal
conclusions is often murky at best,305 instead requiring the plaintiff to
plead the requisite mixed question of law and fact that will go to the
crux of the dispute.
Third, even legal plausibility requires the pleading of some facts
with respect to the law particularization and law application prongs,
meaning that there could well be a factual dispute regarding the way
in which the law impacts the plaintiff. Thus, there would still be a role
for a 12(b)(6) motion regarding factual sufficiency that is separate
from a summary judgment motion, especially if the plaintiff insufficiently alleges the actual effects of the law. It is the plaintiff’s burden
Miller, supra note 195, at 51.
See id. at 22.
305 See id. at 25–26 (suggesting that based on the lower court case law after Iqbal, “like the
Emperor in the well-known fable, the fact-conclusion dichotomy has no clothes”).
303
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to provide facts regarding the operation of the electoral scheme. The
difference is that the plaintiff in an election case almost always has all
of those facts at his or her disposal. Factual plausibility should be easy
for most election plaintiffs to satisfy. Legal plausibility therefore
works in tandem with factual plausibility.
Finally, to the extent that a legally plausible complaint is similar
to a plaintiff’s response to a motion to dismiss, it is still beneficial to
adopt a standard that speeds up the resolution process. Election cases
are unique in that they require timely decisions so that governmental
entities can administer elections using proper legal rules and individuals do not suffer an irreversible violation of their right to vote.306 Any
streamlining of a court’s analysis is beneficial in achieving this goal.
Legal plausibility makes it clear from the outset what the plaintiff
must allege, bringing the legal issues to the forefront earlier in the
process.307 It also permits the court to skip the motion to dismiss stage
altogether because it can evaluate the complaint sua sponte if timeliness is especially important. The approach allows courts to review all
election law complaints when filed and dismiss those that are insufficient, much like courts already do under the PLRA.308 In this way,
legal plausibility can help to weed out frivolous claims because plaintiffs will know precisely what they must include in their complaints,
and defendants will have an easier time pointing out which aspects of
a plaintiff’s complaint are legally insufficient. This will free up courts
to decide those cases that actually have a plausible chance of success.
Ultimately, legal plausibility addresses the incongruence between
the current pleading regime and the reality of election cases. It is possible that the adoption of this standard would not change the eventual
substantive outcome of many disputes. But that is not a reason to
reject the approach. Legal plausibility aligns the Supreme Court’s focus on pleading rules with how election cases actually proceed. Currently, lower courts in election cases either ignore, pay lip service to,
or misconstrue the Court’s new pleading standards. As discussed
above, it makes little sense to stop at factual plausibility in election
cases because, if applied properly, it tells us very little about whether
the plaintiff has a valid case. Legal plausibility streamlines the litigation process and clarifies for litigants in cases that turn on the law how
they should write a complaint in a way that is consistent with today’s
federal pleading goals.
306
307
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See Douglas, Procedure of Election Law, supra note 11, at 455.
See supra Part IV.A.
See supra Part IV.A.4.
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C. Legal Plausibility at Work
Recall that election litigation typically involves one of four substantive issues: redistricting, ballot access, campaign practices/campaign finance, and election administration.309 Each kind of election
law case would benefit from legal plausibility.
First, consider a lawsuit involving new legislative lines, typically
redrawn after a decennial census. Litigants might challenge the new
map under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act for racial discrimination
or vote dilution.310 Under legal plausibility, the plaintiff must provide
more than a conclusory statement that “the map unlawfully discriminates.” Instead, the plaintiff will have to apply the facts of the map to
the well-known standards under section 2 to demonstrate a legally
plausible claim.
In doing so, the plaintiff must establish the three prongs of legal
plausibility in the context of the elements of a section 2 claim.311 First,
under law identification, the plaintiff would have to identify which
specific districts allegedly violate the Voting Rights Act. This ensures
that the plaintiff tailors his or her complaint specifically to the portion
of the map that is allegedly diluting minority voting strength. This
requirement weeds out abstract, general challenges to maps as a
whole.312 Second, under law particularization, the plaintiff would have
to demonstrate that the map actually affects that specific voter. A
plaintiff should not be allowed to move forward unless there is a plausible allegation that the map will actually dilute the voting strength of
that particular voter or group of voters in the challenged districts.
Typically, this requires the plaintiffs to live in the challenged district.313
Finally, under law application, the plaintiff would have to use the wellestablished doctrine for section 2 violations to make a plausible claim
that the specific districts under review violate the law. The plaintiff
would have to show, to a plausible level, (1) that the minority group is
sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a singlemember district, (2) that the minority group is politically cohesive,
and (3) that the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it
usually to defeat the minority’s preferred candidates.314 Again followSee supra Part III.A.
See, e.g., League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 409 (2006).
311 See supra Part IV.A.1–3.
312 Of course, a plaintiff might challenge every district, thereby de facto challenging the
entire map. See, e.g., Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n v. Fields, 75 P.3d 1088, 1093 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 2003).
313 United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 744–45 (1995).
314 Thornburg v. Gingles 478 U.S. 30, 50–51 (1986).
309
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ing the plaintiff’s ultimate burden in a section 2 case, he or she would
also have to allege that the totality of the circumstances plausibly suggests the inability of minority voters to participate in the political process and elect representatives of their choice.315 The plaintiff could
meet the legal plausibility threshold for these elements through his or
her own studies or experts.
This regime might require plaintiffs to present more in a complaint than under Conley or Twombly and Iqbal, but it is the kind of
information that the plaintiff already has (or can obtain fairly easily),316 and it is the type of data that is crucial to determine whether
the court should use its limited resources in allowing the case to move
forward. Legal plausibility achieves the pleading goals of providing
notice to the government defendant, opening the courthouse door to
meritorious claims, and weeding out frivolous lawsuits. It takes what
the plaintiff ultimately will have to prove to win the case and forces
the plaintiff to present a sufficient amount of that information at the
beginning of the litigation.
Courts construing partisan gerrymandering claims already use a
form of legal plausibility because plaintiffs must provide, from the
outset, a judicially manageable standard to prove improper partisan
gerrymandering. The Supreme Court has indicated that partisan gerrymandering claims might be justiciable, but it has not coalesced
around an applicable standard.317 As an Illinois federal court put it,
“political gerrymandering claims remain justiciable in principle but
are currently ‘unsolvable’ based on the absence of any workable standard for addressing them.”318 A plaintiff’s burden, under legal plausibility, is to provide a manageable standard for partisan
gerrymandering and then to apply it to the specific facts of the districting in dispute. As one court explained:
In their Second Amended Complaint, the Plaintiffs have alleged a broad array of facts that, if true, plausibly suggest
that the redistricting plan was enacted in large part to give
Democrats a partisan advantage. But the challenge is to explain how these facts fit together to violate an administrable

315

Johnson v. DeGrandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1007 (1994).
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See supra Part III.A.2.

See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006); Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
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318 Radogno v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections, No. 1:11-cv-04884, 2011 WL 5868225, at *2 (N.D.
Ill. Nov. 22, 2011).
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and non-arbitrary standard for governing political gerrymandering claims generally.319
This is just another way of saying that, even in the complaint, the
plaintiff must make a plausible argument for how the law applies to
the facts at hand or suffer dismissal. The problem, according to this
court, was that the plaintiff’s proposed standard was not judicially
workable.320
Legal plausibility is flexible enough to allow a plaintiff to make
an argument to expand or reinterpret a particular application of a law
given the factual circumstances of that case. So long as the plaintiff
has met the three requirements of legal plausibility, the claim should
move forward. For example, in Metts v. Murphy,321 the plaintiffs alleged that reducing the African-American population in a district
from twenty-six percent to twenty-one percent violated section 2 of
the Voting Rights Act.322 This case arose a few years before the Supreme Court determined that section 2 requires plaintiffs to show that
minorities constitute an actual majority in a district, excluding crossover votes from the white majority.323 Given this ambiguity at the
time, the court of appeals reversed the district court’s decision to
grant the defendant’s motion to dismiss.324 The appellate court noted
that “[t]he burden of inquiry is on the plaintiffs—they are the ones
challenging the redistricting plan—but in this case they are entitled
(within ordinary limits) to develop the evidence that they think might
help them.”325 In essence, the court was saying that there was a legally
plausible argument that the plaintiffs could make out a section 2
claim, even if it required a novel argument under the law.326 As the
court explained:
It is no accident that most cases under section 2 have been
decided on summary judgment or after a verdict, and not on
a motion to dismiss. This caution is especially apt where, as
here, we are dealing with a major variant not addressed in
Gingles itself—the single member district—and one with a
relatively unusual history. As courts get more experience
Id. at *3.
Id. at *3–5; see also Woods v. Bocz, No. 11-1146, 2011 WL 4368831, at *5 (E.D. La. Sept.
19, 2011) (dismissing complaint alleging illegal redistricting because the plaintiffs failed to address the three main elements of a vote dilution claim in their complaint).
321 Metts v. Murphy, 363 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2004) (en banc).
322 Id. at 9.
323 See Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 17–20 (2009).
324 Metts, 363 F.3d at 9.
325 Id. at 12.
326 See id.
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dealing with these cases and the rules firm up, it may be
more feasible to dismiss weaker cases on the pleadings, but
in the case before us we think that the plaintiffs are entitled
to an opportunity to develop evidence before the merits are
resolved.327
Thus, plaintiffs must present a legally plausible claim at the
pleadings stage, but, much like what is permissible under Rule 11 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, that showing can include a plausible argument for the expansion, modification, or reversal of the
law.328 Legal plausibility does not preclude plaintiffs from making arguments to overrule prior rules or alter an interpretation of a law. So
long as the argument is plausible from a legal perspective, the case
should move forward.
Challenges to ballot access laws similarly would benefit from legal plausibility. These laws place various requirements, such as gathering a certain number of signatures, for securing a spot on the
ballot.329 The main facts a plaintiff would need to allege are that the
jurisdiction enforces this law and that the potential candidate, for
whatever reason, was not able to meet the requirements. Most litigants would easily meet this “factual plausibility” standard. But this
says little about whether the plaintiff is actually alleging a valid cause
of action.
Recall Libertarian Party of Virginia v. Virginia State Board of
Elections, discussed above, which involved a Virginia law regulating
who could collect signatures for ballot access.330 The court in that case
construed the complaint under Twombly and Iqbal, asking whether
the plaintiff had presented enough facts.331 But the facts were not the
problem. Instead, the court should have asked whether the plaintiffs
had asserted a legally plausible claim. To do so, the plaintiffs would
have to: (1) identify which specific law they were challenging (the ballot circulator law), (2) establish that the law actually affected them
because it precluded them from ensuring their candidate of choice
would appear on the ballot, and (3) apply the severe burden test, demonstrating that they had a plausible claim of unconstitutionality.
Id. at 11.
Cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (requiring that a party’s “claims, defenses, and other legal contentions [be] warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or
reversing existing law or for establishing new law”).
329 See supra Part II.B.
330 Libertarian Party of Va. v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, No. 1:10-cv-615, 2010 WL 3732012
(E.D. Va. Sept. 16, 2010); see also supra notes 133–41 and accompanying text.
331 Id. at *2–3.
327
328
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Under this third “law application” prong, the plaintiffs would have to
demonstrate to a plausible level that Virginia’s residency requirement
severely infringed their rights by making it too difficult to gather the
required number of signatures to put their candidate on the ballot. To
do so, the plaintiffs would use the standards courts have crafted for
determining whether an election practice imposes “severe” burdens.332
They also would have to plausibly refute any obvious justification that
the state would assert to support the law (such as protecting against
fraud). It is likely that the plaintiffs provided a strong enough legal
argument that it was at least plausible that the ballot circulator law
imposed a severe burden on voters and candidates, and therefore the
court should have allowed the case to proceed. Then, in a summary
judgment motion or other hearing, the court could have determined
based on a fuller development of the parties’ arguments and any additional evidence—such as studies or testimony from the state on the
extent to which the law addresses fraud—whether the plaintiffs’ legal
theories were not just plausible, but correct.
Perhaps, however, the court’s decision would have been the same
in granting the motion to dismiss even under legal plausibility, especially if ballot circulator residency requirements are always constitutional. In some circumstances, adopting legal plausibility would not
be a sea change but an alteration of the lens through which courts
consider motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim, particularly
when plaintiffs already include their legal arguments in their complaints. But the court erred in faulting the plaintiff for failing to present enough facts given that it was not the facts, but the law, that
mattered. More specifically, the most important question is whether
there is a plausible legal argument on how controlling law applies to
the specific facts relating to that plaintiff. That, after all, goes to the
basis of the court’s ultimate merits decision, so it makes sense to construe the plaintiff’s initial submission under this guise.
Campaign finance cases, the third main kind of election dispute,
present the same analysis. In these cases, the plaintiff would have to
identify which specific provision of the challenged campaign finance
regime allegedly imposes an unconstitutional burden.333 The plaintiff
would also have to show that the law adversely affects him or her. For
example, an allegation that a disclosure law simply “might” lead to
harassment will be insufficient to satisfy the law particularization
332 See Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 586–87 (2005) (discussing the severe burden test);
Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 288–89 (1992); Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983).
333 See supra Part II.C.
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prong because the plaintiff has not demonstrated to a plausible level
that the disclosure requirement actually has or will adversely affect
that plaintiff.334 Once again, then, a complaint cannot be devoid of all
factual allegations, but the plaintiff will already have the evidence it
needs to meet the prongs of legal plausibility. Finally, the plaintiff will
have to make a plausible showing, using the elements of the alleged
constitutional wrong, that the law is invalid. For example, if the plaintiff is challenging a disclosure requirement, then the complaint must
include a discussion of the exacting scrutiny standard and an explanation of why the law is not sufficiently tailored to satisfy an important
governmental interest.335
In some ways, this approach for constitutional cases is similar—
although not identical—to what happens at summary judgment. Indeed, the incongruence between campaign finance challenges and the
Twombly/Iqbal standard is likely one reason why courts have resolved
most recent campaign finance cases based on a summary judgment
motion, not a motion to dismiss.336 Functionally, legal plausibility and
a defendant’s summary judgment motion do very similar things by
testing the legal sufficiency of the plaintiff’s case. The standards, however, are not identical; a court must deny a motion to dismiss if the
allegations are legally plausible, while the court must grant summary
judgment if, ultimately, the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.337 Put differently, legal plausibility asks whether the plaintiff is likely to have a valid legal claim, given the existing facts at the
plaintiff’s disposal when initiating the case, while summary judgment
considers whether the plaintiff actually does have a valid claim based
on all of the evidence in the record after discovery. Therefore, legal
plausibility does not replace summary judgment. It supplements it by
allowing courts to dismiss cases at the outset that have no plausible
legal argument. Because assessing the merits of the legal contentions
334 This is consistent with the Supreme Court’s ruling that disclosure laws are valid unless
plaintiffs can show actual evidence of threats or reprisals stemming from the disclosure. See
Citizens United v. FEC, 588 U.S. 310, 371 (2010); John Doe No. 1 v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811
(2010).
335 See, e.g., Family PAC v. McKenna, 685 F.3d 800, 805–06 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Disclosure
requirements are subject to exacting scrutiny. To survive such scrutiny, the disclosure requirements must be substantially related to a sufficiently important governmental interest.” (internal
citation and quotation marks omitted)).
336 See, e.g., Long Beach Area Chamber of Commerce v. City of Long Beach, 603 F.3d 684
(9th Cir. 2010); Thalheimer v. City of San Diego, No. 09-cv-2862, 2012 WL 177414 (S.D. Cal. Jan.
20, 2012); Ctr. for Individual Freedom, Inc. v. Tennant, 849 F. Supp. 2d 659 (S.D. W. Va 2011);
Bluman v. FEC, 800 F. Supp. 2d 281 (D.D.C. 2011).
337 See supra Part IV.B.2.
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are the key to resolving the dispute, it makes sense to incorporate
explicitly a legal plausibility standard as early in the process as possible for these types of cases. This will help to ensure faster resolution,
which will improve efficiency and cost. Adopting this approach also
will untether courts hearing election law disputes from the awkward
application of factual plausibility, a motion to dismiss standard that is
simply ineffective given the nature of the case.
Finally, to the extent that plaintiffs bring constitutional challenges
to voter eligibility requirements or other election administration issues, such as a voter ID law,338 the analysis will proceed much as it
would in the cases mentioned above: the plaintiff must identify specifically which law he or she is challenging, explain how the law actually
affects that plaintiff, and apply the elements of the cause of action to
demonstrate a legally plausible claim. The wide range of pre-voting
election administration challenges fit nicely within the legal plausibility framework discussed above. In addition, as mentioned earlier, legal plausibility could work for pre-election requests for a preliminary
injunction regarding an electoral practice.339
The one election area in which Twombly and Iqbal’s factual plausibility standard provides the most help is post-election disputes about
the actual winner of an election. Most election contest cases, however, do not include motions to dismiss because courts and parties recognize that expediency requires a relaxation of formal litigation rules.
Instead, courts resolve declaratory judgment actions or requests for
injunctions on the substantive merits themselves as much as they can.
For instance, in Joe Miller’s challenge of Lisa Murkowski’s election to
the U.S. Senate from Alaska in 2010, the district court accepted
Miller’s amended complaint as filed even though the state defendants
had not filed an answer “due to the [federal court’s initial] stay in this
matter and subsequent time constraints.”340 Similarly, in a contest involving an election for Hamilton County Juvenile Court Judge in
Ohio, the federal courts were faced with preliminary injunction motions, not motions to dismiss.341
These cases show that when timing is of utmost importance—
such as when a court must resolve an issue involving disputed ballots
that will determine who won the election so that the person may take
office—litigants and courts often skip the motion to dismiss stage and
338
339
340
341

See supra Part II.D.
See supra notes 287–90 and accompanying text.
Miller v. Treadwell, 736 F. Supp. 2d 1240, 1241 (D. Alaska 2010).
Hunter v. Hamilton Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 635 F.3d 219, 222 (6th Cir. 2011).
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move to the merits. This might be in part because we do not want to
decide elections based on the seemingly technical aspects of whether a
complaint is factually sufficient. It provides another reason, however,
for adopting legal plausibility for election cases. Election contests
might be the one area in which the facts of what happened are disputed or unknown at the pleadings stage because the losing candidate
might not have information on precisely how the state handled the
ballots on Election Day.342 But so long as the plaintiff can allege to a
plausible level how, given the facts as the plaintiff knows them, the
tabulation of the votes violated some law, the court should move on to
deciding the merits of the dispute or at least allow discovery to proceed. The last thing we want is an election contest resolved on the
procedural “technicality” of whether a complaint is drafted properly.
Legal plausibility provides a framework for a plaintiff to make its merits-based argument at the outset of a legal challenge to an election
result. Under legal plausibility, the plaintiff must couch its allegations
of election irregularity through the elements of the cause of action.
This approach also ensures that sore losers are not incentivized to
challenge the election unless they can make a plausible legal argument
that something went awry.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s recent focus on pleading rules, combined
with an increase in election litigation, suggests that it is important to
understand the proper pleading standards for this substantive area.
Applying Twombly and Iqbal to election law is incongruent with the
main features of these cases. There is little need to assess whether the
plaintiff presented detailed factual allegations in a complaint when
everyone usually agrees on how an election practice operates. Instead, either the federal courts or Congress should adopt a new pleading rule for election law cases that focuses on a complaint’s legal
plausibility. This regime would require a court to ensure that a plaintiff’s initial submission identifies the specific election practice being
challenged, describes how the rule actually affects that plaintiff, and
explains why, using an application of the elements of the cause of action, the law is plausibly invalid. A court must allow a legally plausible claim to proceed but may dismiss, even sua sponte, complaints that
do not make a legally plausible allegation. Legal plausibility provides
342

See, e.g., In Re Contest of General Election, 767 N.W.2d 453 (Minn. 2009).
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a framework for courts to analyze the legal sufficiency of a complaint.
The approach will harmonize the goals behind pleading law with the
main features of election law cases.

